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POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF
CAPITAL CONTROLS IN EMERGING MARKET
NATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND A LOOK AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
Duncan E. Willians*
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1998, in the middle of the Asian financial crisis, life
looked quite bleak for many Indonesians. Mrs. Tratiwoon, a young
woman, worked barefoot scavenging through vast heaps of garbage
for enough scrap material to earn a living recycling.' She expressed
her hope that her three-year-old son would someday rise above her
plight and grow up to work in a sweatshop. She worried, however,
that the Asian financial crisis, which had stifled much of Indonesia's
economic activity, would put such a position beyond his reach.- While
Indonesia's president called for his countrymen to fast twice a week to
save rice, the number of prostitutes and beggars swelled in Jakarta.4
Even in relatively well-to-do South Korea, stories abounded of laid-
off workers killing themselves and their families or giving their
children up to orphanages.5
These dramatic tales of suffering illustrate the human cost of
financial crises in emerging market nations. Western nations assert
that less developed countries ("LDCs") should open their capital
systems to allow unimpeded movement of investments around the
globe. LDCs should, however, carefully consider the full impact of
such advice. While increased capital mobility may speed economic
development in capital importing nations,6 the destabilizing effects of
* Expected J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2002. The author wishes to
thank, first and foremost, his wife, Frdd6rique Williams, for her unfailing love and
support. Gratitude is due to the author's parents for their steady stream of good
advice. Thanks also to Professor Victor Essien for his helpful comments on this Note.
1. Nicholas D. Kristof, Asia's Crisis Upsets Rising Effort to Confront Blight of
Sweatshops, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1998, at Al.
2 Id
3. Id
4. Still Sick and Gloonzy, Now Rebellious, The Economist, July 11. 1998, at 41.
5. Id
6. See, e.g., Keeping the Hot Money Out, The Economist, Jan. 24, 1998, at 69
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unbridled international capital flows greatly aggravate the dangerous
and degrading conditions that many Westerners so despise, such as
the plight of Ms. Tratiwoon.
This Note examines the use of legal restrictions on international
financial transactions, known as capital controls. Countries use capital
controls to regulate financial transactions between residents and non-
residents.7  Capital controls can affect every type of financial
transaction.8 Countries typically impose capital controls to discourage
capital inflows or outflows or to influence their make-up? The key
element of this diverse group of policy measures is that they "all
attempt to restrict the movement of capital across national
boundaries.""0
Economists have only recently begun to build economic models to
test empirically whether capital controls help LDCs achieve economic
stability. A look at some of these empirical findings and the research
into recent financial crises reveals that capital controls can be a useful
policy tool, when properly employed, in easing a LDC's path of
economic development. This Note begins by combining and
presenting these findings. Using this conclusion as a basis, this Note
then argues that the trend in the international legal regime towards
the removal of capital controls in LDCs should be reevaluated and
that the International Monetary Fund ("IMF" or the "Fund") and
LDCs should adopt a more balanced approach to capital mobility.
This Note ultimately concludes that neither the IMF nor any other
new or existing multilateral institution should have jurisdiction over
LDCs' use of capital controls.
Free-marketers consider capital controls anathema, characterizing
them as government interventions that distort market economies and
cause more problems than they solve. The Asian financial crisis that
erupted in 1997, however, has reinvigorated the debate over the
effectiveness of these measures since most East Asian countries
(noting that for most of the 1990s Asia enjoyed large inflows of foreign capital that
increased the region's growth rate).
7. See Ross B. Leckow, The Role of the International Monetary Fund in the
Liberalization of Capital Movements, 17 Wis. Int'l L.J. 515, 515-16 (1999) (discussing
the nature of capital controls and why countries impose them).
8. See, e.g., id. at 515. One author notes that countries use capital controls to
regulate
i) the purchase or sale of debt or equity securities, mutual funds, or money
market instruments, ii) the making of a financial loan or guarantee, iii) the
making of a deposit in a bank account, iv) the purchase or sale of real estate,
and v) the making of a direct investment such as the purchase of a majority
interest in an enterprise.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Government of Malaysia, Economic Issues: Capital Controls, (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (describing the uses of capital controls in developing
countries).
10. Id.
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largely eliminated capital controls in the early 1990s." Part I of this
Note looks at the causes of this crisis in order to give a brief
illustration of the problems that capital controls are meant to
overcome and to give some insight into how financial instability
unfolds in emerging markets.'
Part II lays out the basic elements that define capital controls and
explains why LDCs use them. Part II begins with a comparison of
direct controls, such as quotas, which are more blunt policy
instruments, and market-based, or indirect, controls, which impede
capital flows by imposing costs on financial transactions." After
looking at what capital controls are, Part II next discusses why
countries use them, paying special attention to two fundamental
problems: the need to protect against the negative effects of foreign
capital inflows and the instability caused by fickle foreign investors'
decisions to remove capital invested in LDCs. Part II explores the
specific policy goals that capital controls are thought to serve with
respect to these two persistent problems.
Part II concludes with a look at how the debate over capital
controls has evolved. Many mainstream theorists have accepted that
capital controls have a place in the development of a sound financial
system in LDCs. Section C of Part II looks at the issue of whether
LDCs should abandon capital controls early in the financial reform
process or wait until the country has developed a stable and sound
financial system." To frame this debate this section lays out the steps
needed to create an efficient financial system in an LDC."6
Part III argues that many of the justifications for capital controls are
well-founded: capital controls can, if the right conditions are in
place,17 reduce financial instability in LDCs and help LDCs ensure
their economic sovereignty. 8 This part discusses the capital controls
used in Chile 9 and Malaysia20 in recent years to support this
argument. This part then goes beyond economic theory and looks at
the non-economic and legal justifications for capital controls."1 The
human cost of financial instability'- and economic sovereignty
concerns23 provide even greater justifications for capital controls.
11. Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6, at 69.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B..
15. See infra Part II.C.1.
16. See infra Part II.C.2.
17. See infra Part III.A.1.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part III.A.2.
20. See infra Part III.A.3.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part III.B.1.
23. See infra Part III.B.2.
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This analysis of the types, uses, and justifications of capital controls
ultimately leads to a discussion of the current international legal
regime governing the capital account.24  Part IV examines the
multilateral legal regime to show that no international institution
currently has jurisdiction to restrict LDCs' use of capital controls.'
Building on the arguments showing the effectiveness of capital
controls, and contending that continued use of capital controls in
LDCs is a positive result, Part IV argues that this status quo should be
maintained.26 This is true not only based on the analysis in Parts II
and III, but also because of the tendency of multilateral institutions to
expand their "supranational authority' '27 and because of a lessening
concern for the specific circumstances of LDCs. 8 Part IV discusses
proposals to reform the IMF that seek to restrict LDCs' use of capital
controls, and shows why such proposals would make LDCs worse
off.29 This Note shows why LDCs should maintain control and
discretion over when and how to use capital controls and why LDCs
should not cede authority to a multilateral institution to decide what
capital controls are appropriate.
I. THE CAUSES OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
This part will provide a brief analysis of the causes of the Asian
financial crisis. Synthesizing the generally received explanations of
this tumultuous event, this part familiarizes the reader with the
problems that can occur in emerging market countries' financial
systems that make them more vulnerable to volatility. In order to
highlight the key problem of weaknesses in the banking sector and its
special relevance to the issue of capital controls, this exposition will
focus on the problems in Asian banking.
The 1997-99 Asian financial crisis resembled in many ways the
Mexican banking crisis of 1994-95 and the ensuing financial market
contagion, dubbed the "Tequila Effect."3  These two emerging
market crises differed from those of past decades in their sudden
intensity and the quick reaction from the developed world.3' The
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.A, IV.B.
26. See infra Part IV.C.
27. See infra Part IV.C.1.
28. See infra Part IV.C.2.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 45-46,
96-97 (discussing similar factors that led to banking and currency crises in the two
regions); International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 10
(comparing the causes of financial crises in Thailand and Mexico).
31. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 74 (noting
that financial crises in recent years differ from those earlier in the twentieth and late
nineteenth centuries in that the "spillover effects and the contagious spread of crises
seem to have become both more pronounced and far reaching"). To illustrate the
sudden reversal in Asia, net private capital flows in Indonesia represented 6.3% of
[Vol. 70
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Mexican crisis was novel "due to the speed with which it developed,
the possible disastrousness of its consequences, and the amount of
money required to remedy it. '3 2 The Asian financial crisis replicated
this new scenario, with even greater severity and a more intense
overreaction by financial markets.33 These severe disruptions in the
operation of international financial markets have been dubbed "post-
modern" financial crises as the confluence of conditions giving rise to
them-technological innovations allowing for instantaneous
transactions, the use of riskier financial instruments, and increased
financial integration and liberalization-did not occur until the early
1990s. 4
These severe disruptions also shared common underlying economic
causes: short-term financial liquidity problems, sparked by sudden
speculative pressure on the domestic currency, laid bare fundamental
regulatory shortcomings that, once revealed, in turn deepened the
severity of the liquidity problems. 5 The instability seen in both crises
began in the most vulnerable countries (Thailand and Mexico) and
then spread to other susceptible, but more stable countries (Korea,
Indonesia and Argentina) through a "contagion effect,"' the intensity
of which was much greater than that experienced in previous
decades.37
The "East Asian Tigers"'  all began to experience economic
difficulty in 1996, when the booming growth rates of the previous
decades slowed.39  Early 1997 saw large-scale bankruptcies of
important firms in all economic sectors in Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia.' Asia's economic bubble had burst, and this economic
GDP in 1996, while at the end of 1997 they stood at 1.6%of GDP. International
Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 6. Similarly, in the Philippines
they were 9.8% of GDP in 1996 and 0.5% in 1997: in Thailand, 93% in 1996 and
negative 10.9% of GDP in 1997. Id.
32. John H. Chun, Note, "Post-Modern" Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need
an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2647, 2650 (1996).
33. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 10.
34. See Chun, supra note 32, at 2650-51.
35. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 10.
36. Id at 74-75. The term "contagion effect" denotes a general withdrawal of
foreign investors from the markets and downward pressure on the currencies of
countries in reaction to a downturn in another country. See id. at 83-88 (discussing the
major factors behind financial contagion in the context of currency crises); see also
infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
37. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 83.
38. The term "East Asian Tigers" originally referred to four countries whose
economies and foreign trade expanded dramatically in the second half of the
twentieth century: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. John Black, A
Dictionary of Economics 135 (1997). The term expanded to include other East Asian
countries whose aggressive economic growth called to mind the ferocious animal.
39. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 2.4.
40. See, eg., Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis: Unraveling of the Miracle in the IMF
Era 2-16 (1999).
2001]
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downturn laid bare the problems of many countries' banking sectors.1
By the late summer of 1997, foreign portfolio investors began an
exodus from Asia by pulling out of Thailand." As the liquidity short-
falls of Asian financial sectors became apparent one by one, the IMF
stepped in to broker loans to Thailand ($17 billion) in July 1997,
Indonesia ($40 billion) in November, and Korea ($55 billion) in
December.43 The primary seeds of this economic disintegration were
an excessive build-up of short-term foreign investment, an economic
bubble, and a poor financial regulatory and supervisory environment.
A. Build-Up of Short-Term Investment Leads to Asset-Price "Bubble"
The build-up in short-term foreign investment in Asian economies
began with a decline in asset yields in the industrial economies, which
induced a "surge in capital inflows to emerging markets in the early to
mid-1990s." The successful performance of most of the economies
concerned 45 made them prime targets of investors from developed
countries looking for higher returns.46 Underdeveloped and under-
supervised financial systems in LDCs could not productively
intermediate and deploy this large inflow of capital.47 The potential
variability of the inflows also posed problems for the financial systems
involved, as well as for macroeconomic and exchange rate policy.48
These intermediation and volatility problems are associated much less
with foreign direct investment ("FDI") 49 and other long-term flows
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 16-17.
43. See, e.g., Dan Taylor, The International Monetary Fund: Wallet Sore to the
West or Savior to the Global Financial Crisis?, Currents: Int'l Trade L.J., Winter 1999,
at 79, 81.
44. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 4.
45. The Asian economies most affected by the financial turmoil were Korea,
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
46. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 4.
47. A financial system serves as an intermediary between savers of funds and
borrowers of funds. Financial intermediaries must find borrowers that will use the
funds productively so that savers can be repaid. Black, supra note 38, at 175-76; see
also International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 10-14
(discussing financial intermediation problems in Asian economies).
48. Variability of inflows causes excessive upward and downward swings in LDC
stock markets and exchange rates that lead to an overall unstable climate for
investment activities. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows (Aug.
1999), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/worlddevelopment2.pdf [hereinafter
Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows].
49. FDI refers to the acquisition of real assets in another country. FDI typically
connotes the purchase, expansion, or creation of a foreign subsidiary. The most
common characteristic of FDI "is that it involves not only a transfer of resources but
also the acquisition of control." Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International
Economics: Theory and Policy 168 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter Krugman & Obstfeld,
International Economics].
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than with short-term portfolio and debt flows.s In East Asia, short-
term inflows were, however, substantial."1
This surge of short-term foreign investment created structural
problems for Asian countries whose financial systems were not
sophisticated enough to deal with such an inflow.- The inflow of
capital spurred the growth in many Asian economies, most notably
Thailand's, of "bubble" economic booms based on rapidly increasing
investment in cyclical assets such as real estate. 3 The growth of credit
to the private sector accelerated the expansion of these economic
bubbles and the inflation of asset prices.' The rapid growth of private
sector credit was largely attributable to burgeoning capital inflows,
many directly into the banking system, which were reflected in rising
official foreign exchange reserves."
B. Financial Regulatory Problems
Poor regulation and supervision of Asian financial systems allowed
large amounts of short-term capital to flow unchecked into unsound
investments. 6 The poor foundations of the financial sector and other
structural weaknesses led to low-quality and excess investment that
made many of Asia's economies extremely vulnerable to adverse
developments.' Also leading to East Asia's precarious position was
the fact that bank credit plays a larger role in the region's economies
than in those of other emerging market countries." For example, in
50. Cf. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook. May 1998, at 3
(discussing the excessive build-up of short-term foreign borrowing as a factor
contributing to the Asian financial crisis). Portfolio investment denotes the
acquisition of financial securities and bank deposits, Black, supra note 38, at 184, and
typically involves a shorter time horizon and a less committed investment.
51. The most precariously positioned borrower was Thailand. where loans and
portfolio investment were dominant, making up 7 to 10% of GDP in each year from
1994 to 1996, while FDI represented a meager 1% of GDP. International Monetary
Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 4. Similar investment inflow maturity
profiles were evident in other East Asian nations. See id.
52. Asia's financial system had not developed to a point where banks were
making credit decisions based on risk assessment. Government-directed lending to
risky companies and crony-lending, particularly in Korea, further weakened banks'
balance sheets. Id. at 12.
53. Id. at 10.
54. See, e.g., id. (discussing the rapid growth of private sector credit in Thailand).
55. Thailand's foreign exchange reserves more than doubled between 1992 and
early 1996, while over the same period its commercial banks' foreign liabilities grew
from 7% to 24% of their total liabilities. Id. at 54. A similar pattern emerges for
many of the other Asian countries mired in crisis. See id. at 52-54.
56. See iL at 12 (discussing the weakness of Korea's financial regulation system).
57. See id at 12-13; see also John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial
Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United States, Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, Spring 1998,
at 70 (discussing the causes of the Asian financial crisis and giving prescriptions for
improving banking practices in Asia).
58. Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?, The Economist, Aug. 21, 1999, at 16.
2001]
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Malaysia outstanding loans represented 150% of GDP, while the
comparable figure in Brazil was 43%.19  Despite a lack of
transparency6° that initially retarded widespread awareness of the
problems, unsound points in the financial sector became apparent in
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea once the speculative bubble of asset
prices burst.6' Inadequate regulation and supervision of financial
institutions, limited experience among financial institutions in pricing
and managing risk, a lack of commercial orientation, and poor
corporate governance all combined to drive many institutions into
insolvency.62
Compounding the problems in the banking system, some
governments' implicit approval of unsound banking practices led to a
classic "moral hazard."63 As in much of the world, Asian governments
made no attempt to disabuse the public of the mistaken belief that
many of their deposits with financial institutions were explicitly
guaranteed.' Bankers also felt less exposed to risk, thinking that
government would step in and nationalize bad debts.65  This
encouraged bankers to take on excessive risk, as they reaped the
benefits of successful risky investments while taxpayers cleaned up the
mess of unsuccessful ventures.' Where financial intermediaries do
not bear the risk of their investments, they will not carefully select
their borrowers.
Under-regulation and inadequate supervision compounded this
excessive risk-taking. While many Asian bank regulatory authorities
required adherence to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
capital adequacy standards,67 they did not monitor carefully enough
59. Id.
60. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 80 (noting
that "[wihen banking difficulties first emerge, bank owners and managers, and public
authorities, are often tempted to conceal their extent").
61. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 10-12.
62. See id. at 82-83. A key problem in Asia, most prevalent and well-documented
in Korea, was the practice of banks lending to related enterprises and the cross-
guaranteeing of debt by corporations within the same conglomerate. Kirk, supra note
40, at 7, 9; see also Ellen J. Shin, Note, The International Monetary Fund: Is it the
Right or Wrong Prescription for Korea?, 22 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 597, 600-
04 (1999) (giving background information on the origin of the financial problems in
Korea in the chaebol system).
63. "Moral hazard" results when economic agents are protected against the risks
of failure of an economic activity by insurance or a promise to pay by another party.
The implicit or explicit protection against economic loss makes people take greater
risks, which raises the likelihood that the economic failure will occur. Black, supra
note 38, at 309.
64. See Why Did Asia Crash?, The Economist, Jan. 10, 1998, at 66.
65. See id.
66. Paul Krugman, What Happened to Asia? (1998) (unpublished manuscript), at
http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html [hereinafter Krugman, What
Happened to Asia?].
67. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a forum where senior
representatives from the central banks of the Group of Ten work to formulate a set of
[Vol. 70
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the components of banks' loan portfolios.' The minimum
requirements of the Basle Core Principles are not sufficient to cover
all of the bad loans made in the asset-price-bubble environment
described above. A central feature of the Asian crisis is that a number
of insolvent institutions in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and other
countries were permitted to continue operations with central bank
subsidies.69
In some Asian countries, regulatory authorities not only failed to
supervise banks adequately, they also directed banks to lend to state-
favored industries and companies." Lending associated vith political
relationships,71 corrupt practices,- and loose internal controls
accelerated the financial crisis. The Korean government's heavy-
handed control of the industrial sector through direct credits, tight
regulation, and subsidies artificially promoted less competitive
companies and kept companies from developing sound business
practices.73 Directed lending and other ways of favoring certain
entities introduced other structural weaknesses into Asian
economies.74 Trade restrictions, import monopolies, and regulations
similarly stifled economic efficiency and prevented investment from
finding its most productive outlets." In Thailand and Indonesia,
political disarray delayed the implementation of necessary financial
sector reforms.76
C. Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis
International capital mobility may not maximize economic
efficiency if banks are over-guaranteed and under-regulated." This is
one of the more novel discoveries brought on by the Asian crisis and
the 1994 peso crisis. 78 Asia's macroeconomic fundamentals were for
Core Principles for sound banking supervision. See International Monetary Fund,
World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 84-85 & n.1.
6& See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 12-13.
69. See Why Did Asia Crash?, supra note 64; Asia's Economies: On Their Feet
Again?, supra note 58, at 17.
70. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 12.
71. Id.
72. Government corruption is idely thought to impede the development of
regulatory institutions. Jared Levinson, "Fragile, Handle with Care". Indonesia and
the Issue of Capital Controls in a Nation Facing Disintegration, 17 Wis. Int'l L. 529,
532 (1999).
73. International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 14; see also
Su-Hoon Lee, Crisis in Korea and the IMF Control, in The Four Asian Tigers:
Economic Development and the Global Political Economy 209, 210-15 (Eun Mee
Kim ed., 1998) (discussing the Korean model of state-directed lending and
conglomerate-led economic expansion).
74. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 12.
75. Id at 14.
76. See id! (discussing political disarray in Thailand).
77. Why Did Asia Crash?, supra note 64, at 66.
7& See Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?, supra note 58, at 16, 17-18
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the most part quite sound (with governments throughout the region
having more or less achieved fiscal balance and inflation being quite
low), despite a cyclical recession in 1996 brought on by the downturn
in Japan.7 9 Conventional currency-crisis theory suggests that the
currencies of stable economies should not come under speculative
attack.8° The diverse economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and the Philippines were, nonetheless, still susceptible to a
loss of confidence by foreign investors.8' Asia's susceptibility lay in its
heavy reliance on short-term foreign inflows that were certain to be
withdrawn once the unhealthy position of its financial institutions
became known.
The Asian crisis differs from conventional exchange-rate crises 2
because it was seemingly brought on entirely by the problems in the
financial sector.8 3 When asset-price bubbles burst and the currencies
began to depreciate, the many problems of banks and other financial
intermediaries were laid bare. Further decline in currency values and
a deepening of banking problems became intertwined in a vicious
cycle.8s
This brief exposition of the causes of the Asian financial crisis
illustrates why many commentators have argued that the unchecked
flow of foreign investment into emerging market and newly
industrialized countries can exacerbate an array of economic
problems. LDCs often turn to legal restrictions on the movement of
some types of foreign investment as a way to mitigate these problems.
The following sections will explore the use of capital controls as a
means of stabilizing emerging market economies.
II. TYPES OF CAPITAL CONTROLS AND THE PRIMARY POLICY
REASONS FOR THEIR USE
This part first lays out the different types of capital controls. Both
direct, or administrative, controls and indirect, or market-based
controls, are used by LDCs to control foreign investment. This part
then examines the relationship between external and internal factors
(discussing problems with Asia's banks); Survey: Banking in Emerging Markets: After
the Quake, The Economist, Apr. 12, 1997, at 18.
79. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 2-3.
80. See Krugman, What Happened to Asia?, supra note 66.
81. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing "herding behavior"
among investors and the "contagion effect").
82. See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Oct. 1993, at
29-36 (discussing the causes and factors leading to the 1992-93 crisis in the European
Monetary System's exchange rate mechanism); see also Timothy A. Canova, Banking
and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 Am. U. Int'l
L. Rev. 1571, 1609 (1999) [hereinafter Canova, Banking and Financial Reform]
(discussing the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s).
83. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May 1998, at 74-75
(discussing the link between exchange-rate and banking crises).
84. See id. at 75.
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that lead countries to implement capital controls, examining the
theoretical justifications cited by economists and policymakers.
Finally, this part will explore the parallel debates over whether capital
controls reduce volatility and, if so, how far an LDC's financial
institutions and infrastructure must develop before the country can
successfully remove its capital controls. To frame the debate over
how much an LDC's financial system must develop before it can
prudently remove capital controls, this part outlines the long process
of reforming an LDC's financial network into an efficient and well-
functioning system.
A. Types of Capital Controls
Any type of transaction that causes financial resources to move
from one country to another is a potential target for restrictions by
capital controls: purchase by foreigners or sale abroad by domestic
residents of securities, money market instruments, credit operations,
or FDI.1 Capital controls often augment a country's prudential
measures (i.e., financial regulations and oversight seeking to limit risk-
taking of financial intermediaries and borrowers).' Capital controls
fall into two broad categories: "(1) administrative or direct controls
and (2) market-based or indirect controls."'  Direct controls involve
prohibitions on specific types of transactions, quotas, rule-based or
discretionary approval, and minimum-stay requirements. Indirect
controls rely primarily on explicit or implicit taxation to discourage
capital flows.'
An analysis of capital controls requires an understanding of their
relationship to prudential regulations. As the discussion below
illustrates, capital controls, when used appropriately, can overlap with
prudential regulations. They differ, however, in that their direct
objective is somewhat more immediate. Prudential regulations
attempt to permanently alter and improve the behavior of economic
agents. Capital controls try to artificially alter the choices made by
economic agents while a country's financial system develops to the
point where the capital controls are no longer necessary. Thus, capital
controls and prudential regulations overlap and reinforce each other
but do not necessarily serve the same functions.?
85. R. Barry Johnston & Natalia T. Tamirisa, 11%.y Do Countries Use Capital
Controls? 5-6 (IMF Working Paper, 1998).
86. See id at 16.
87. See Akira Ariyoshi et al., Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their
Use and Liberalization 6 (IMF Occasional Paper 190.2000).
88. Id.
89. See id at 52.
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1. Direct Controls
Direct controls usually involve outright prohibitions on specified
transactions between residents and non-residentsf0 These can also
take the form of cumbersome approval procedures that seriously
deter foreign investment, even FDI.91  While often broadly
implemented, governments sometimes effectively tailor direct
prohibitions to prevent specific types of transactions. The usual
methods of administrative or direct controls are prohibitions,
quantitative limits (quotas), rule-based or discretionary approval, and
minimum-stay requirements for direct and portfolio investment. 2
Direct capital controls usually seek to reduce the overall volume of
capital inflows.93
Quantitative limits, or quotas, often take the form of outright bans,
or ceilings, on investment.94  Quotas are extremely "blunt
instruments" of economic policy, and are considered to have a highly
distortionary impact on investment decisions. 5 Considerations other
than economics, such as nationalism or history, often drive quotas on
investment.96 But quotas do have some potential as an effective
control to correct for market imperfections.' For example,
quantitative limits on bank lending may be appropriate as a prudential
measure in many LDCs. 98 Limitations on offshore borrowing and
non-trade-related swaps are similarly used to limit banks' and
domestic residents' foreign borrowing. 99
Quantitative limits and other administrative controls can be an
important information signal to foreign investors that banks and other
90. See id. at 6.
91. See id.; see also Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation
of Foreign Direct Investment. The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 12-13 (1995) (discussing transaction costs as a disincentive
to FDI).
92. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7. Portfolio investment denotes the acquisition
of financial securities and bank deposits. Black, supra note 38, at 184. FDI is usually
differentiated from portfolio investment in that the former involves ownership and
management of businesses rather than mere ownership of securities. See supra note 49
(defining FDI); see also Roman Terrill, Coping with Private Capital Markets, 9
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 303, 312-13 (1999) (discussing the differences
between portfolio investment and FDI).
93. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7.
94. Donald J. Mathieson & Liliana Rojas-Saurez, Liberalization of the Capital
Account: Experiences and Issues 4 (IMF Occasional Paper 103, 1993).
95. S. Neal McKnight, Note, Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital
Controls in Economic Liberalization, 82 Va. L. Rev. 859, 889 (1996).
96. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7.
97. McKnight, supra note 95, at 891 ("[C]ontrols in the form of prudential
regulations may correct for market imperfections in the financial sector."); see also
Guillermo A. Calvo et al., Capital Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in
Latin America, 40 IMF Staff Papers 108, 143-44 (1993).
98. Calvo, supra note 97, at 149; McKnight, supra note 95, at 890.
99. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 52.
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financial market agents are following prudent practices."" Such
prudential controls01 can form part of a permanent regulatory
regime. 02
Similarly, part of a prudential regulatory regime can include
requiring foreign investors to gain administrative approval before
being allowed to own a country's securities. Taiwan's Qualified
Foreign Institutional Investors ("QFII") requirement is an example of
this type of administrative control. 3 Under the QFII, foreign
investors must gain approval from Taiwan's security markets
regulatory agency prior to making investments in the Taiwanese stock
exchange." 4 Designed to prevent speculation in a country's securities,
the QFII tries to reduce financial market instability."~'
2. Indirect Capital Controls
In general, indirect, or market-based, controls "discourage
particular capital movements by making them more costly.""''
Market-based controls often involve explicit or implicit taxation "on
external financial transactions, thus limiting their attractiveness.""'2 A
country can also tax dividends or repatriation of profits to the same
effect. Tax rates on different types of transactions can vary in order to
encourage or discourage certain transactions. L~s
Another method of market-based capital controls is to employ dual
or multiple exchange rates.109 This means that different exchange
rates apply to different transactions."0  Such a system restricts
100. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 891. Other types of capital controls, such as
outflow restrictions, can make markets nervous that the country is reneging on policy
commitments to economic liberalization in general. See id. at 892; see also infra notes
326-34 and accompanying text (discussing investors' reactions to Malaysia's use of
capital controls in reaction to the Asian financial crisis).
101. Capital controls used to limit banks' risk-taking in foreign currency
borrowings closely resemble a prudential measure, or regulations that restrict overly
risky behavior by financial intermediaries.
102. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 892-93.
103. See Richard N. Watanabe, Foreign F-rchange and Capital Movement Controls
in Taiwan, 16 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1, 10-11 (1997). The QFII also requires approval
for invard and outward remittances. Id. at 11. While this last element makes the
QFII somewhat restrictive, the general policy could be an effective means of reducing
destabilizing inflows.
104. See id at 10-11.
105. Id.
106. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 6.
107. Id. at 7. Explicit taxation involves a direct levy by the government on a
financial transaction, while implicit taxation involves a cost imposed by the
government that is not explicitly called a tax. See infra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text (discussing the most widely used method of implicit taxation, the
unremunerated reserve requirement).
108. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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speculators' access to foreign exchange, but still allows access to trade
flows,"' FDI, and equity investment. These restrictions usually
attempt to change both the quantity of financial transactions and their
price.'
Other indirect controls include provisions for commercial banks'
net balance in foreign currency, limitations on unpaid foreign
currency option contracts "that discriminate between long and short
currency positions or between residents and nonresidents," and the
requirement of a minimum credit rating to borrow abroad."3
Minimum rating requirements for corporations and banks allowed to
borrow abroad can be considered a prudential measure, but are
similar to indirect controls.14  In the same vein, stringent reporting
requirements on banks for all capital account transactions look like a
prudential measure, but greatly enhance regulators' ability to monitor
capital movements, make key determinations, and enforce capital
controls."5
Indirect taxation has received the most attention in the literature on
capital controls, and has been used quite frequently in the past decade
in LDCs. 116 The most widely discussed method of indirect taxation is
the unremunerated reserve requirement ("URR"), where "banks and
nonbanks dealing on their own account are required to deposit at zero
interest with the central bank an amount of domestic or foreign
currency equivalent to a proportion of the inflows or net positions in
foreign currency.''1 7  In other words, in addition to the actual
investment, a URR requires foreign investors to put an amount equal
to a certain percentage of that investment into an account with the
central bank that earns no interest. Investors can get back increasing
portions of the deposited funds as the investment remains longer in
111. For a discussion of the effect of capital controls on trade flows, see Natalia T.
Tamirisa, Exchange and Capital Controls as Barriers to Trade 3-7 (IMF Working
Paper, 1998) (arguing that capital controls "represent a noticeable barrier to trade,"
but that the theoretical effect of controls on trade is "somewhat ambiguous" and
there is little empirical evidence either way).
112. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7.
113. Id. An investor who holds a "long position" in foreign currency holds foreign
assets or currency that he does not currently have an arrangement to sell, as he
anticipates a rise in their price. Black, supra note 38, at 279. An investor with a "short
position" has entered into "[a] contract to sell, for future delivery, [currency or assets]
in excess of the amount [he] actually holds," planning on a fall in the price so that the
promised asset or currency can be purchased at a lower price in the spot market and
sold at a profit. Id. at 428.
114. Cf. Watanabe, supra note 103, at 27-30.
115. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7. Monitoring derivative transactions takes on
special importance in enforcing capital controls. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id.; see also Bernard Laurens & Jaime Cardoso, Managing Capital Flows:
Lessons from the Experience of Chile (IMF Working Paper, 1998) (discussing Chile's
use of the URR); Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6, at 69-70 (same).
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the country." 8 A URR serves many functions. It makes borrowing
abroad more expensive for domestic banks."9  A URR can target
specific kinds of investment, 20 can be imposed on all liabilities
denominated in foreign currency, 2' or can require all foreign investors
to deposit a percentage of their investment as a deterrent to a volatile
departure.
B. Why Countries Use Capital Controls
This section explores the practical considerations that lead LDCs to
employ capital controls. Controls are implemented in reaction to two
fundamental problems: First, despite all the benefits of foreign capital
inflows, imported financial resources also have negative effects on the
domestic economy; second, foreign capital flows are extremely fickle,
which leads to domestic economic instability. " LDCs justify the use
of capital controls as a means of overcoming these two fundamental
problems and other difficulties stemming from them. More
specifically, capital controls are justified as a way to stabilize the
domestic exchange rate, correct market information imperfections
that occur in LDCs, control short-term speculative transactions,
reduce financial market volatility, curtail excessive risk-taking by
economic agents, induce capital formation, and give the domestic
financial system time to develop without undue pressure. Each of
these justifications is discussed below. '
Throughout the developing world, "[r]ecourse to controls on capital
flows... is generally quite pervasive."' 4 Within individual countries,
use varies from omnipresent implementation to more selective
restrictions." The history and purpose of controls also vary widely
from country to country. Some controls are holdovers from past
regimes whose purpose and effectiveness is no longer certain, while
others are innovative tools of macroeconomic and structural policy.12 6
118. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 7 (discussing the URR).
119. McKnight, supra note 95, at 885, see also David Folkerts-Landau & Takatoshi
Ito, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Policy Issues 97
(1995) (discussing uses of the URR).
120. McKnight, supra note 95, at 886. But since capital controls need to be broad
to be effective, see infra text accompanying notes 262-68. this element might not be
such an advantage to most developing countries.
121. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 886; see also Susan Schadler, et al., Recent
Experiences with Surges in Capital Inflows 19 (IMF Occasional Paper 108, 1993)
(noting the impact of such a control in curbing excessive foreign borrowing by
domestic banks).
122- See infra Part II.B.1.
123. See infra Part II.B.3.
124. Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 1.
125. See id at 4.
126. See id When capital controls in all sectors of financial activity are considered,
there are quantitatively more controls in place to restrict capital outflows than
inflows. See id at 7. This is true for all areas other than FDI, where controls on
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Just as the types of capital controls vary considerably, the policy
reasons behind their use also differ. This section explores the policy
objectives that propel countries to employ capital controls, focusing
on the use of capital controls to stabilize domestic financial markets in
the face of large inflows of foreign investment. It also explains the
theoretical justifications used to support these policy considerations.
1. Impact of Foreign Capital Flows on Economic Development
To understand why countries use capital controls, one must first
appreciate the effect of capital account liberalization127 in LDCs. Two
extreme views prevail as to whether international capital flows into
LDCs produce the net effect of encouraging economic development.
Most economists believe that exporting capital to developing nations
enhances economic efficiency and increases the rate of economic
growth."2  This "neoliberal consensus" argues that the pain and
adjustment of financial instability will only persist in the short-run and
that financial liberalization will lead to increased living standards in
the long-run. 129
The other side of the argument, led by such scholars as Jagdish
Bhagwati 3 ° and Dani Rodrik,3 ' contends that there is no evidence
that opening a country's capital account causes significant increases in
the growth rate.132 This group argues that LDCs will not necessarily
employ foreign capital in the most efficient way because of
inflows are more prevalent than controls on outflows. See id. The higher incidence of
controls on inflows of FDI than on outflows can largely be explained by the fact that
controls on inflows of FDI are often used for non-economic reasons. See infra text
accompanying notes 189-92, for a discussion of the non-economic reasons for
restrictions on inflows of FDI.
127. Capital account liberalization refers to a country allowing foreign capital to
move freely into and out of its territory through financial transactions. This is also
referred to as "opening the capital account." Black, supra note 38, at 51 (defining
"capital mobility").
128. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 1 (discussing how
imported capital is used more efficiently in developed countries than in LDCs); see
also Marco Rossi, Financial Fragility and Economic Performance in Developing
Economies: Do Capital Controls, Prudential Regulation and Supervision Matter? 3
(IMF Working Paper, 1999) (discussing the "broadly accepted" notion that "financial
liberalization, by fostering financial development, can increase economic
performance").
129. See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary
Dis/order, and the Neoliberal State, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1279, 1361 (2000)
[hereinafter Canova, Financial Liberalization].
130. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in
Widgets and Dollars, Foreign Aff., May/June 1998,7.
131. See Dani Rodrik, Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?, in Should the
IMF Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility?, Essays in International Finance No.
207, Department of Economics, Princeton University (Peter Kenen ed., 1998); Dani
Rodrik, Growth Versus Poverty Reduction: A Hollow Debate, Fin. & Dev., Dec. 2000,
8.
132. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 1-2,4.
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information asymmetries. 33 Information asymmetries worsen as the
geographic and cultural gap between capital exporters and capital
importers grows.13 This analysis of the problems leads to the
conclusion that "the analogy between free trade and free capital
mobility... is fundamentally flawed."'35
The intermediate view between these extremes holds that LDCs
can achieve the benefits of partial capital mobility (allowing capital to
flow to what productive investments can be found in a country) while
still protecting against the worst effects of portfolio capital volatility.'3 6
Regardless of whether financial inflows ultimately have a positive
impact on a country's rate of development, experts agree that capital-
importing countries do not exclusively control the factors influencing
foreign capital inflows. 37 It is widely accepted that "[t]he primary
forces driving investor interest in emerging markets... are the search
for higher returns and risk diversification."'' " When faced with the
inability to control the factors that induce foreign investment inflows
and the destabilizing effects that follow, developing countries often
seek to artificially limit their attractiveness to foreign investors.
At a minimum, the free-marketers (or neoliberals) agree that the
"banking crises of the 1980s and 1990s have pointed out the link
between financial liberalization and financial fragility and the
existence of a... trade-off between the benefits of liberalization and
the costs of increasing financial fragility."'3 9 This is not to say that a
very closed capital account will allow a country to escape all of the
volatility of international financial flows,'1 but rather the more open a
country's capital account, the more susceptible it is to volatile inflows
and outflows of foreign capital. Capital controls seek to find the right
balance between the benefits of openness to foreign investment and
its costs in terms of instability. Once the fact that financial inflows can
cause instability in LDCs' economies is accepted, the major reasons
for employing capital controls become easily understandable. The
133. See id at 2. Information asymmetries arise when some economic agents have
more information than others. This is obviously the case in any real economic
environment, and it is heightened in the context of foreign investment in LDCs by the
fact that investors are often unfamiliar with the country, its legal and financial
systems, and its business culture. Black, supra note 38, at 16.
134. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 6.
135. Id. at 2.
136. See Canova Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1315-19.
137. See Linda M. Koenig, Capital Inflows and Policy Responses in the ASEAN
Region, (IMF Working Paper, 1996) (analyzing the nature of and factors influencing
foreign inflows into the ASEAN region); Alejandro L6pez-Mejfa, Large Capital
Flows: A Survey of the Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses (IMF Working
Paper, 1999) (analyzing the factors behind capital flows to LDCs and the patterns and
trends of these flows, emphasizing the external factors).
138. L6pez-Mejfa, supra note 137, at 15.
139. Rossi, supra note 128, at 3.
140. Cf. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 29-30 (discussing the effects of financial crises
on countries with very closed capital accounts, such as India and China).
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next subsection looks more closely at the causes of financial instability
in LDCs.
2. Instability and the Contagion Effect
Most capital controls seek to reduce "the vulnerability of
developing countries to the volatility of international capital
markets."'' In designing a capital control regime to address this
problem, the key principle emphasizes that "[p]ortfolio investment...
tends to be more liquid and sensitive to changes in yield," and hence
more volatile than longer term investments such as FDI 4 z When
used both for prudential concerns and macroeconomic reasons, capital
controls have attempted to alter maturity composition 143 as well as the
volume of inflows.'" Short-term inflows have typically been seen as
more volatile and more destabilizing, especially in places where
financial institutions cannot efficiently intermediate the inflows. 45
The "contagion effect," whereby a financial crisis in one LDC
spreads to other seemingly unrelated economies, produces another
key element in the vulnerability of LDCs to volatility. 46 One of the
primary culprits in financial contagion is a market phenomenon
known as "herding behavior,' '147 meaning, in short, that investors are
prone to collective actions. 48 Investors "infer information about the
fundamental value of their investments from one another's actions,"
in what economists call "information cascades.' 1 49 Herding behavior
causes investors to "stamped[e] in and out of markets."'50  This
stampeding is compounded by the tendency of "international
investors.., to overlook weaknesses in the domestic policy
environment until they are abruptly brought to their attention, at
which point markets over-react.' 15' These two market imperfections
141. McKnight, supra note 95, at 872.
142. Id.; see also L6pez-Mejfa, supra note 137, at 16 (finding that portfolio flows are
the type of investment most sensitive to interest rates). Sensitivity to yield changes
denotes an investment vehicle's use as a speculative device, as most speculation
involves interest rate arbitrage. Cf. Geoffrey G.B. Brow, The Tobin Tax: Turning
Soros into Plowshares?, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 345, 346-47 (1999).
143. "Maturity composition" means the relative amounts of long and short term
investment that make up the total amount of foreign investment.
144. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 9.
145. See Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6, at 70.
146. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 872-73.
147. See L6pez-Mejfa, supra note 137, at 22-23 (discussing herding behavior).
148. See Barry Eichengreen, Capital Controls: Capital Idea or Capital Folly? 5-6
(Nov. 1998), (unpublised manuscript) at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengrl
capcontrols.pdf [hereinafter Eichengreen, Capital Controls].
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id.
151. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 2. "If [a fund manager's
mandate] stipulates the fund has to perform at least as well as the median fund, the
incentive to herd increases." L6pez-Mejfa, supra note 137, at 22; see also International
Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, May, 1998, at 7 (noting the "apparent
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combine to mete out a punishment to LDCs that is "disproportionate
to the crime. 152 As discussed above,153 the farther afield investors
wander, the more the information problems that lead to herding
behavior and overreaction are aggravated."s Speculation and herding
behavior even afflict countries with sound economic fundamentals., 5
3. Justifications for Capital Controls
While some argue that capital controls are implemented in LDCs
primarily for domestic political aims,'56 the five major justifications for
imposing capital controls focus on decreasing financial instability.
First, the most widely used theoretical justification in the economic
literature comes from what welfare economics calls a "second-best
solution."1"7 The term second-best solution describes the situation
where "an economy... suffer[s] from one distortion [that] is difficult
to tackle... directly," and welfare can be increased "by adding
another, off-setting distortion."''5 Here, the second distortion is the
capital control, which is used to correct an even more welfare-
reducing distortion, such as an information asymmetry.
A country can correct for distortions such as information
asymmetries either by improving market regulation and supervision
or by imposing capital controls. As discussed above, the distortions,
or market imperfections, in LDC economies are not easily corrected,
making reliance on capital controls the best short-term solution to
stability problems.5 9 "[W]eak or insolvent banking systems [and]
moral hazard problems related to official guarantees and the absence
of developed financial markets" are other distortions that can be
corrected in a "second-best" way by capital controls."
Capital controls also commonly aim to control short-term
speculative transactions that induce exchange rate volatility and lead
to other macroeconomic problems such as inflation.'6' In addition to
instability in the financial sector, large foreign inflows can cause
problems for a country's balance of payments' and its domestic
tendency for investors to react exuberantly to success, belatedly to emerging
concerns, and eventually to overreact as sentiment changes").
152. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 2.
153. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
154. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 6.
155. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 874.
156. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 72, at 544 (characterizing Malaysia's use of
capital controls as primarily for "domestic political reasons" (quoting James Clad &
David Steinberg, A Post-Crisis Look, Geo. Mag., Winter 1999, at 37)).
157. Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 15.
158. Id. (discussing this finding as made in M. Dooley, A Survey of Literature on
Controls over International Capital Transactions, 43 IMF Staff Papers 4 (1996)).
159. See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
160. Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 15.
161. See Watanabe, supra note 103, at 3.
162. Balance of payments accounting tracks the changes in a country's
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monetary policy targets.163 Capital controls often try to resolve the
economic policy dilemma of having more objectives than policy tools.
Using capital controls, countries can maintain a somewhat fixed
exchange rate while also keeping inflation down. Governments try to
reconcile these ordinarily contradictory policies in an open capital
account economy through capital controls.1 6
Before imposing new controls on capital inflows, countries typically
try to counter heavy foreign inflows with the economic tools of
sterilization 65 and fiscal policy.166 Most stabilization programs used by
countries to counter a surge in foreign inflows start with sterilization
and then move to capital controls once the cost of sterilization, in
terms of reduction in central bank reserves and increases in interest
rates, becomes pronounced. Capital controls have been used
extensively in the past two decades to reduce reliance on sterilization
while still allowing countries to follow the conflicting goals of
stabilizing their currency and keeping inflation low. 168 While in the
past these types of macroeconomic concerns have been the primary
impetus to impose capital controls,169 empirical research suggests that
countries today are using capital controls for reasons more closely
related to the development of their financial systems. 7'
When a country's financial system is not relatively well developed,
keeping financial agents from engaging in excessively risky activities
proves difficult. This points to the third major reason countries use
controls: To stem excessive risk-taking by economic agents when
insufficient government supervisory and regulatory institutions exist
or when an implicit exchange rate guarantee encourages a build-up of
unhedged foreign currency borrowing7 ' by banks and companies 7
indebtedness to the rest of the world and the amount of net income it receives from
imports over exports. Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, supra note 49,
at 302.
163. The primary monetary policy concern of most countries is price stability, i.e.,
keeping inflation down, but some monetary authorities also actively manage the
country's exchange rate, especially in LDCs. Black, supra note 38, at 303 (defining
monetary policy).
164. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 5 (discussing the conflicts between maintaining
a fixed exchange rate and price stability).
165. Sterilization refers to the central banks selling securities on the open market
to counteract the expansionary effect of capital inflows on the money supply. For a
thorough discussion of sterilization, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see
Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, supra note 49, at 494-96.
166. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 877. Fiscal policy responses to foreign inflows
would consist primarily of reducing the level of government spending to curb
inflationary pressures. See id.
167. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 49.
168. See id. at 6; Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 13-14.
169. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 8.
170. See Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 3 ("[Rjecourse to capital controls
reflects the overall framework for economic regulation and the degree of financial
market development.").
171. Hedging foreign currency borrowing involves buying derivative instruments to
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These prudential concerns, or measures to rein in the risk-taking of
financial intermediaries and borrowers, have historically played a less
important role in the decision to implement capital controls."'-
Prudential concerns, however, offer a better basis for future capital
control measures. Controls, in this context, are put in place to
preserve "systemic stability" by limiting "excessive foreign exchange
exposure of domestic institutions, or help[ing] lengthen the maturity
of liabilities of financial institutions."'74 In the absence of effective
bank supervision, capital controls are a second-best solution to
prevent excessive foreign borrowing while proper prudential
standards take hold.175
A fourth reason to control capital flows is to prevent domestic
citizens' savings from leaving the country and thereby preventing
capital formation.'76 Controls on outflows serve primarily to prevent
capital flight, or large-scale departure of residents' and non-residents'
capital sparked by fears of instability or rampant inflation.' Outflow
controls can also stimulate domestic capital formation.""r In the same
way that capital controls on inflows can prevent a build-up of capital
that is suddenly withdrawn, causing financial instability, controls on
capital outflows can prevent capital already built up, both domestic
and foreign, from suddenly pulling out of the country.' 9
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, LDCs impose capital
controls to allow their emerging economies time to develop to the
point where they can withstand the cycles of the international
financial markets without excessively destabilizing volatility. w
"[C]lear and efficient legal, accounting, and taxation systems and
standardized legal practices" form the basis of a sound market
economy.1 81 These practices and rules take time to implement and
enforce. In addition, regulatory authorities must have sufficient
capacity to supervise a sophisticated financial system. To do this,
different regulatory authorities must learn to share information, and
protect against an unexpected depreciation in the domestic currency, as the cost of
repaying foreign loans consequently goes up in terms of the local currency.
Unhedged foreign currency borrowing would not protect against this risk. John
Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 237
(4th ed. 1995).
172. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 5.
173. See id. at 3-4.
174. Johnston, supra note 85, at 15.
175. See id. at 16.
176. See, e.g., Krugman & Obstfeld, International Economics, supra note 49, at
504-06.
177. See, e.g., Black, supra note 38, at 49.
178. See Watanabe, supra note 103, at 3.
179. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Malaysia's use of controls on capital
outflows).
180. See Toyoo Gyohten, East Asian Capital Markets, 21 Fordham Int'l Ll. 371,
374 (1997).
181. Id.
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countries have to learn to standardize financial institution
supervision."8 Lastly, well-regulated and institutionalized domestic
capital markets form the basis of a country's ability to absorb foreign
capital inflows efficiently.
While many mainstream theorists accept that capital controls can
play some role in helping to achieve each of these policy objectives,
how useful they are and for how long an LDC can use them are two
debated issues. The next Section looks at the issue of whether LDCs
should maintain capital controls once their financial system
development begins to gain momentum or whether they should lift
controls relatively early in the development process.
C. When Should Countries Use Capital Controls?
In between ardent supporters of the free market and equally ardent
protectionists, the central debate over capital controls concerns
whether LDCs should abandon them early in an economic reform
process, or continue to use them until all the major kinks in a
country's financial infrastructure have been smoothed out. This
Section describes the debate over capital controls and looks at how it
has evolved in light of the Asian financial crisis.
The primary controversy over capital controls relates to when a
country should liberalize its laws governing capital transactions and
whether capital controls can help put in place the financial system
infrastructure necessary to an open capital account. This discussion
begins by examining the generally accepted uses of capital controls
and looks at support for them among mainstream economists, for in
some situations the wisdom of particular controls is largely beyond
reproach. The more contentious issue-how much a country must
reform its financial infrastructure before opening its domestic capital
markets-follows. This analysis looks at the steps a country should
take before liberalizing its capital account in order to ensure financial
stability.
1. Acceptability of Capital Controls
The world community does not roundly reject all capital controls.
In fact, most Western European nations used capital controls to attain
full convertibility of their currencies and to limit inflows of short-term
capital. 3 International law widely accepts some uses of capital
controls, such as to protect vital national interests." Whether a
182. Id.
183. See Timothy A. Canova, Commentary, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital
Mobility and the Limits of the Orthodox Imagination: A Critique of Robert Solomon,
Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance Since 1980, 9 Minn. J.
Global Trade 219, 221-22 (2000) [hereinafter Canova, Unrestricted Capital Mobility].
184. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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capital control could be considered restrictive depends on the
jurisdictional context used to evaluate the measure."" The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements provides a
good starting point for determining whether a certain type of control
is considered restrictive by the standards of the industrialized
nations. 86 Membership in the OECD now precludes the use of most
capital controls,"f reflecting the view that most capital controls
restrict the workings of the free market.ss
Countries have historically limited foreign investment for reasons
including nationalism, economic instability, and "ideological
opposition to capitalism."1" A country might limit FDI in particular
sectors to protect its sovereignty, i.e., sectors that it thinks are
important for "economic, political, military, or cultural
independence."' 19 Parallel to the nationalistic reasons are historical
reasons: Many LDCs were, until relatively recently, colonies
controlled by the now-industrialized nations. The cultural legacies of
LDCs' disdain for this period are apparent in many of these countries'
legal institutions, including controls on foreign investment.'" Capital
controls can, arguably, allay this fear of neo-colonialism in LDCs and
allow gradual introduction of foreign-owned businesses.
Until recently, most Western economists and policymakers largely
accepted that capital controls were inefficient and pressured LDCs to
liberalize their financial markets.'" The Mexican banking and
currency crisis in 1994-95 began the current debate over capital
controls,9 3 but the Asian crisis has intensified the debate and
increased support for capital controls.)'9 With the onset of the Asian
185. Johnston, supra note 85, at 5 n.3.
186. See id.
187. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1614-15.
188. See id at 1615 n.180 (noting that art. l(d) of the OECD Code of Liberalisation
of Capital Movements requires "all OECD members to 'endeavour to extend the
measures of liberalisation to all members of the International Monetary Fund"').
189. McKnight, supra note 95, at 868.
190. Leckow, supra note 7, at 516. While FDI has commonly been thought
important to capital-importing countries' development by bringing "managerial and
technological knowledge [sic]," it is clear in the context of this discussion that FDI
also has costs. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 3. Another cost
of FDI is the anti-foreign sentiment that special treatment for foreign FDI often
receives in capital-importing nations. See Gray & Jarosz, supra note 91, at 16.
191. See, eg., Kirk, supra note 40, at 1 (discussing Korea's fear of control by
outsiders stemming from its fifty-year colonial domination by Japan in the beginning
of this century).
192. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past.- Globalization, International
Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 243, 256-57
(2000).
193. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1597-1604;
McKnight, supra note 95, at 860-62.
194. See National Bureau of Economic Research, Proceedings on Capital Account
Convertibility: Capital Controls in Emerging Market Countries (Nov. 6, 1998),
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financial crisis, the debate over capital controls changed: Prior to this
event a broad consensus advocating the removal of capital controls
had emerged; after 1998, the debate centered on "when, and what
type of capital controls are [sic] appropriate."'95
Economists at the IMF produced strong evidence of the
effectiveness of capital controls in some situations for the better part
of the 1990s.196  The idea of "taxing financial transactions to
discourage speculative activities [that] are not in line with economic
fundamentals," however, goes back to John M. Keynes.' 7 Keynes
developed the idea to increase the transaction costs of speculative
activities. 98 Nobel laureate economist James Tobin's 1978 proposal of
a tax to "throw sand in the hyperactive wheels of international capital
movements" received much attention and has been much debated.' 99
Capital controls gained wider acceptance almost overnight when Paul
Krugman, the leading thinker in modern international monetary
economics, came out in support of their use to allow countries some
breathing room in the midst of financial crises. 210
2. Steps in the Reform Process
This subsection shows why the use of capital controls has gained
http://www.nber.org/crisis/capital.htmi; see also Tito Cordella, Can Short-Term Capital
Controls Promote Capital Inflows? 4 (IMF Working Paper, 1998) ("The financial
crisis in [Asia]... weakened the case for an early and complete liberalization of
capital transactions."). But see Cynthia N. Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign
Liquidity Crises: New International Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital
Flows to and from Emerging Markets, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 807, 811 (1998) (stating
at the outset of the Asian financial crisis that "there seems to be considerable
agreement... that the reinstitution of capital controls for countries facing an
exchange crisis resulting from volatile outflows is not a solution").
195. Betty Whelchel, Preventing Asia Type Crises: Who, If Anyone, Should Have
Jurisdiction over International Capital Movement?, 5 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 417,
417 (1999).
196. See, e.g., McKnight, supra note 95, at 864 & nn.25-27 (noting earlier research
showing the effectiveness of capital controls). Empirical testing of capital controls
continues to evolve. Economists are still developing econometric models to
accurately reflect their effects on LDCs. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 5.
197. See Howell H. Zee, Retarding Short-Term Capital Inflows Through
Withholding Tax 3 (IMF Working Paper, 2000) (discussing Keynes's introduction of
the idea in his work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936)); see also Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1611-12
(arguing that Keynes foresaw the use of art. VI of the IMF Arts. of Agreement as a
means of forestalling destabilizing speculative activity in financial markets).
198. Zee, supra note 197, at 3.
199. Id. The Tobin tax would tax all financial transactions involving the conversion
of one currency into another. See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary
Reform, 4 E. Econ. J. 153 (1978); see also Francisco Nadal-De Simone, The Tobin
Tax: Coping with Financial Volatility-A Review Article, 42 Singapore Econ. Rev. 32
(1997); Brow, supra note 142, at 384-89 (discussing implementation of a Tobin tax in
the United States).
200. See Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time To Get Radical, Fortune, Sept. 7,
1998, at 75, 79.
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wider acceptance among economists as an effective part of a financial
reform process. Certain steps must be taken before an emerging
market country can productively employ foreign capital, as this
subsection shows. The country should first strengthen its financial
sector and then gradually allow different types of investment, starting
with FDI and ending with domestic borrowing from foreign banks.
While this lengthy process unfolds, capital controls, some have
argued, can prevent excessive foreign borrowing. This section
describes the process of reforming an LDC's financial sector to the
point where more or less full capital account liberalization is
appropriate. Subsection III.A.1., infra, describes the somewhat
analogous, but much less strenuous, conditions necessary for
successful implementation of capital controls.
In order for inflows of foreign capital to have net benefits for a
country, some crucial conditions must be in place?" The right
conditions include sound and effective prudential regulation"'a and
other steps that take several years to implement. The essential policy
question is how to find the right balance of risk and return-of
openness and its benefits-but measured with enough restrictions to
minimize the risk of destabilizing swings in capital flows. ' ' The
question is not whether to cut off international capital flows
completely, but how to reduce the flows to a manageable level.21
Liberalization does not just mean removing government from the
operation of the economy.2 5 To the contrary, developed countries
have successful financial systems because they have highly
sophisticated and active regulatory agencies.' Government's role is
not to direct with a high degree of specificity where investments must
be made, as happened in Asia, but to confine financial institutions
within broadly defined limits of prudent financial activity2"'
201. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evidence
on the benefits of foreign capital inflows in LDCs.
202. See Asli Demirgtig-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Financial Liberalization and
Financial Fragility 3 (IMF Working Paper, 1998) (using statistical research to
"support the view that financial liberalization should be approached cautiously where
the institutions necessary to ensure law and contract enforcement and effective
prudential regulation and supervision are not fully developed"). One of the principal
lessons of the Asian crisis is a realization of the importance of a sound -domestic
financial system in achieving the benefits and avoiding the risks of liberalization."
Rossi, supra note 128, at 3.
203. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 3 (noting that
countries should "liberalize flows just to the point where the benefits, in terms of
additional stimulus to growth, continue to dominate the risks, in the form of
susceptibility to financial disruptions").
204. Id.
205. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 893.
206. Even developed countries' financial institution regulators sometimes fail to
supervise market activity with sufficient caution. The savings and loan crisis in the
United States demonstrates that no country is immune to such lapses in supervision.
207. See International Monetary Fund, World Econ. Outlook, Dec. 1997, at 12-13.
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Governments in LDCs should search for the legal controls that
change the composition of capital inflows or limit them with the least
amount of market distortion.2 °8
Most economists agree that capital account liberalization should
come at the end of a reform process. 209 Considering that developed
countries took several decades to open their own capital accounts,
most commentators think that LDCs should be permitted some
leeway in getting to this stage.21° Capital account liberalization "is the
logical culmination of the process of developing a deep, mature and
efficient domestic financial system. "211
Although the interrelationships of "capital account liberalization,
prudential regulation and supervision, financial fragility and economic
performance" needs more empirical research to make a precise
blueprint for gradual liberalization of the capital account,212 some
general steps have been identified. A country should "first strengthen
the domestic financial sector, remove implicit guarantees, and impose
hard budget constraints on domestic financial institutions. '213  The
banking sector should be recapitalized before liberalization, and
prudential supervision and regulation must be improved.214  As a
measuring stick, capital controls "are justifiable only where financial
markets are thin, the private sector's risk-management practices are
underdeveloped, and the regulators' capacity to supervise the
financial sector is limited. 215
Some countries have liberalized their capital accounts rapidly to
signal a strong commitment to reform to the financial markets.1 6 The
experiences of countries like Argentina, Kenya and Peru highlight the
need for financial reform before rapid liberalization, lest the country
be more prone to seriously adverse shocks.217 The slow pace of reform
in post-crisis Asia's banking sectors, financial markets and bankruptcy
laws demonstrates how long this process can take.218 Structural
reforms of this magnitude have "an unavoidably long time-scale,21 9
208. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 865 (arguing for limiting "capital flows with
the least distortion").
209. Id.
210. See Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 4-5.
211. Id. at 4.
212. See Rossi, supra note 128, at 4.
213. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 8.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 8.
216. See, e.g., Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 31 (discussing the rapid liberalization
process in Argentina, Kenya and Peru).
217. See id.
218. See Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?, supra note 58, at 16 (discussing
the slow pace of reform in many Asian countries' banking sectors, financial markets
and bankruptcy laws).
219. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Capital Controls Needed to Manage Crises, (Sept.
1998), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/mana-cn.htm (reiterating the point that LDCs
will also need the decades that developed countries took to produce the institutions
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and some economists have in fact recognized that the "transitional"
use of capital controls may be over a long period. '2u At a minimum,
the proper sequencing of a liberalization program requires the use of
capital controls, at least temporarily. 2'1
The sequencing of a capital account liberalization program should
begin with FDI, as FDI is less likely to "aggravate weaknesses in the
domestic banking system."' FDI is thought to bring several benefits
to a developing economy: longer time frames are involved; investors
are more involved in planning and managing projects, so inefficient
investments are less likely to result; and FDI is typically thought to
involve a transfer of technology and management skills.m FDI
stimulates trade, as almost 50% of international trade is between
affiliated companies, in what is known as intra-firm trade.2'
The next step in a capital account liberalization program should be
the limited opening of securities markets to foreign investment. 5
Stock and bond markets should be liberalized before banks and
companies are allowed to borrow abroad.' Here again, information
about corporations' financial health does not flow to foreign investors
without a solid regulatory framework. Such a regulatory structure
takes a considerable amount of time to build up.-7  Legal rules
"requiring disclosure, discouraging insider trading and protecting the
rights of minority shareholders"''2 will not immediately start working
effectively. Markets for corporate bonds usually follow the solid
formation of a market for a "benchmark asset" within the country,
such as government treasury bonds, 9 which markets have yet to
develop in many parts of East Asia. Importantly, once securities
markets are opened, capital controls will still be needed for some time
required to function with a fully liberalized capital account).
220. Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 5.
221. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 883.
222. Eichengreen, Tanzing Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 9. This advice is taken
as "obvious" by most economists and others, but the 144 of 184 members of the IMF
who still maintain controls on FDI have not heeded this advice. Id. This highlights
the fact that the non-economic reasons for restricting FDI often win the debate. See
infra Part III.B. (discussing the non-economic reasons for restricting foreign
investment).
223. McKnight, supra note 95, at 880-81 & n.1 11.
224. See Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 673, 673 (1995).
225. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 11 ("[Floreign
investment in securities poses fewer risks than short-term foreign deposits.").
226. See id at 12 (arguing that the "most reliable predictor.., of currency crises is
the term structure of portfolio capital inflows"-that is, when portfolio inflows come
primarily in the form of foreign borrowing of banks and companies directly from
foreign banks rather than through capital markets).
227. See id
228. Id.
229. Id
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to prevent them being used as speculative conduits.2 3°  Local
derivatives markets, similarly, help financial agents hedge against risk
and reduce volatility,23n but foreign access to such markets must
initially be limited with capital controls to prevent local derivatives
markets from becoming vehicles for speculation.
One of the chief lessons of the Asian crisis is that bank borrowing
abroad should be the last element of the capital account to be
liberalized, rather than the first.12  LDCs should limit corporate
borrowing in foreign currencies until deep and liquid markets for
corporate debt in the local currency develop and the companies learn
to operate under restraints imposed by financial markets. 3  Also,
limitations on foreign borrowing by banks can be circumvented by
corporations borrowing from abroad and onlending to banks.'
The majority of economists roughly agree on the foregoing
discussion of the proper sequencing of capital account liberalization. 5
The primary debate over this liberalization process instead involves
the timing of such reforms and whether capital controls can effectively
contribute to them by stabilizing financial markets while they are in
place. Arguments against using capital controls while financial system
infrastructure goes into place highlight the costs of capital controls.
Capital controls may discourage desirable capital flows and current
account payment transactions in addition to discouraging "hot
money." 6  Capital controls also involve "nontrivial administrative
costs. ' '2" If regulatory reform does not simultaneously occur when
capital controls are implemented, controls reduce the incentive for the
domestic financial industry to make structural changes and may also
prevent the domestic market from adjusting quickly to changing
international conditions." Finally, capital controls give rise to
"negative market perceptions," i.e., they shake investors' confidence
and make borrowing more expensive.239
230. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 50 (discussing corporate debt used as a
speculative device). The governor of Mexico's central bank said the 1994 crisis was a
"direct result of the sudden and complete opening of the Mexican securities market to
capital inflows." Watanabe, supra note 103, at 22.
231. See Watanabe, supra note 103, at 29-30.
232. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 13.
233. See Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?, supra note 58, at 18.
234. Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 7.
235. See Whelchel, supra note 195, at 417.
236. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 6. The term "hot money" connotes investment
capital that "capriciously seek[s] high, short-term yields. Borrowers attracting hot
money.., should be prepared to lose it as soon as another borrower offers a higher
rate." See Downes & Goodman, supra note 171, at 246; see also Canova, Financial
Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1287 (defining the term "hot money").
237. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 6. Administrative costs include the cost to the
government of setting up a bureaucracy to supervise financial transactions and police
them for avoidance of capital controls. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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Even a relatively well-developed region such as East Asia has many
steps to take before its capital markets develop enough to deal
efficiently with foreign inflows. 40 Many Asian countries do not yet
have primary and secondary markets for equity and long-term bonds,
or secondary markets for government bonds to function as benchmark
securities.241 Development of financial markets in East Asia has been
slowed by a lack of transparency, or companies' reluctance to release
reliable information.242 Much of the problem comes from the lack of a
proper legal framework for the functioning of financial markets. 243
Other legal reforms needed to ensure efficient functioning of Asia's
capital markets include cracking down on insider trading, ameliorating
currently uncertain settlement procedures, and increasing the number
of regulatory and supervisory agencies to monitor capital markets. 2'
While such reforms form the basic foundation of efficient capital
markets, they take many years to fully implement.
LDCs have lately pressed the case for capital controls. 45 They
insist they need controls to manage crises, rather than having to resort
to fiscal and monetary tightening. Such fiscal and monetary austerity,
they contend, only deepens the decline by driving otherwise solvent
businesses into bankruptcy when interest rates are ratcheted up.2'
LDCs argue that markets are imperfect and do not always perform
optimally, and that not even the best financial regulation can prevent
financial crises.47 When the markets do fail, citizens of LDCs bear a
greater level of hardship than people in industrialized nations.2'
Developed countries, many LDCs further argue, used capital controls
until recent decades, and this allowed their regulatory structures and
financial markets to develop to the point of remaining stable in the
face of volatile capital flows.249 For example, most European nations,
after World War H, while in a somewhat analogous position to that of
240. See Gyohten, supra note 180, at 372; Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?,
supra note 58, at 17-18.
241. See Gyohten, supra note 180, at 373.
242. Id
243. See, e.g., Asia's Economies: On Their Feet Again?, supra note 58, at 18
(discussing the need for stricter auditing of companies and more rights for minority
shareholders).
244. See Gyohten, supra note 180, at 373.
245. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 303-04 (describing the debate on capital controls
between the industrialized nations and the LDCs).
246. See Raghavan, supra note 219.
247. See id.
248. See Levinson, supra note 72, at 539-42 (discussing the human cost of the Asian
financial crisis in Indonesia); see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
249. See Raghavan, supra note 219. "Countries with both open and closed capital
accounts" have experienced financial crises, but much evidence indicates that a
liberalized capital account increases the risk of a currency crisis, and the costs
incurred from a crisis with an open capital account are also increased. Eichengreen,
Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 7 (discussing evidence on this point).
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LDCs, employed capital controls to stem excessive inflows of foreign
investment during the decades of their reconstructiono °
While the multilateral institutions and industrialized nations have
put pressure on LDCs to open up their capital accounts
prematurely, 25l only the staunchest free-marketers argue against all
capital controls.ni Finding an equilibrium between economic
liberalization and the use of capital controls and other non-market
policy measures is difficult." The next part argues that this
equilibrium is best achieved by a proactive regime of modern capital
controls, coupled with a committed reform and strengthening of the
domestic financial sector.
III. CAPITAL CONTROLS CAN EFFECTIVELY REDUCE FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY IN LDCs AND ENSURE COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC
SOVEREIGNTY
This part argues that capital controls effectively reduce financial
instability in LDCs, if employed under the right conditions. It begins
by exploring the conditions necessary for an effective capital control
regime and then examines the successful use of inflow controls by
Chile and the implementation of outflow controls by Malaysia. This
part then moves beyond economic theory to argue that non-economic
reasons validate LDCs' use of capital controls. Unchecked capital
mobility coupled with inefficient investment produces financial
instability that in turn generates a great human cost and a reduction in
LDCs' economic sovereignty. These results make a persuasive case
for continued use of capital controls by LDCs.
A. Effective Capital Control Regimes
Economists measure the effectiveness of capital controls in terms of
how well they have helped countries achieve the policy goals driving
their implementation.' In most countries this goal is to increase
domestic financial stability. The majority of economic literature on
capital controls has focused on their effectiveness (or lack thereof),
and much contention surrounds this area of research. 55 In any case,
250. See Government of Malaysia, supra note 9.
251. See Anghie, supra note 192, at 255-56.
252. See, e.g., Ian Visquez, The Irrationality of Capital Controls, Cato Institute
Commentary (Nov. 3, 1998), at http://www.cato.org/dailys/l 1-03-98.html (arguing that
proposals to implement capital controls to correct market imperfections are
misguided).
253. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 863; Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows,
supra note 48, at 3-8.
254. Cf. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 5; Eliana Cardoso & Ilan Goldfajn, Capital
Flows to Brazil: The Endogeneity of Capital Controls, 45 IMF Staff Papers 161, 166
(1998).
255. For thorough studies presenting evidence for and against the effectiveness of
capital controls, see Ariyoshi, supra note 87, and Barry Eichengreen & M. Mussa,
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"no unique best approach" arises from the literature-while some
types of controls work better than others, a country must choose a
mix of policies that best suits the conditions prevailing in its
economy.26 This section looks at the necessary elements of an
effective capital control regime, and discusses what steps an LDC
must take before it can successfully implement capital controls. This
contrasts with Part II.C.2., supra, which discusses the steps needed to
reform an LDC's financial system to a point where capital account
liberalization is appropriate. While some of the steps may overlap,
the entire reform process entails much broader transformation. A
discussion of the use of capital controls in two countries, Chile and
Malaysia, follows to illustrate what effective capital control regimes
can accomplish.
Empirical research, as illustrated in the Chile discussion, shows that
capital controls can effectively alter the maturity profile of inflows
towards the longer term, but the evidence also suggests that capital
controls generally do not reduce the overall vohtme of inflows into
LDCs.17 New research suggests increased stability does not require
an overall reduction in inflow volume, provided maturity composition
is affected." The discussion of Malaysia indicates that controls on
outflows are less effective than inflow controls. Whether capital
controls can prevent banking crises remains under examination,59 but
some beneficial effects have been identified when the right conditions
are in place.
1. Conditions Necessary for an Effective Capital Control Regime
Before any country can effectively employ capital controls to
reduce financial instability, certain conditions need to be in place. In
general, three elements are necessary: (1) coverage of transactions
needs to be comprehensive; (2) the controls must be forcefully
implemented; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) increased
prudential regulation and supervision of the financial system must be
simultaneously implemented.261
Capital Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects. IMF Occasional
Paper No. 172 (1998).
256. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 4, 17.
257. Id. at 16.
258. See infra Part III.A.2. for a discussion of this research in the context of an
assessment of Chile's URR.
259. See Demirgtiq-Kunt & Detragiache, supra note 202. at 3 (finding that "banking
crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems"). But see Rossi, supra
note 128, at 15 (finding that the "degree of liberalization of capital inflows... turn[s]
out to be statistically insignificant" with respect to banking crises).
260. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 17.
261. Cf. Lichtenstein, supra note 194, at 812 (noting that "financial sector reform
and the creation of a domestic banking system that adheres to adequate ... prudential
standards and is regulated and supervised by an independent technically adequate
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The first element requires that a capital control regime cover a
broad swath of transactions. Research has shown Brazil's capital
controls did not stabilize the country, largely because Brazil's highly
developed financial markets found ways to exploit loopholes in the
controls. 62 Such controls may be useful, however, in countries with
less well-developed financial markets, such as most of the East Asian
economies. Even in Chile, where the URR has been acclaimed by
many as a stabilizing force,263 the regulatory authorities were
frequently revising their capital controls to cover the new avoidance
techniques.26 As Chile learned, a broader coverage of different types
of financial transactions is most effective.
Strong enforcement requires fluid communication between the
central bank and the commercial banks and comprehensive disclosure
from the latter.265 The government must also continue to police the
financial markets for avoidance of its capital controls, as financial
markets learn to exploit derivatives to negate capital controls. 26 An
effective capital control program requires setting up a legal
framework that corrects existing market distortions while introducing
the least number of new distortions.267 "Interventions which rely on
markets instead of bureaucrats minimize [the] risks" of "rent seeking
and corruption" by the officials who administer capital controls and
also the risk that as sophisticated financial markets develop they will
evade controls by simply "relabeling positions and repackaging
obligations. 26
An effective capital control regime also requires strengthening of
the financial sector. If controls are imposed without financial sector
strengthening, such as improved asset quality requirements for banks
and increased supervision, capital controls will allow the system to
become less efficient and less able to handle foreign inflows when
capital account liberalization finally arrives. Empirical research shows
that countries whose capital controls did not work as a means of
supervisory system" is the "sine qua non" of stabilizing emerging markets (emphasis
omitted)).
262. See id.; see also Laurens & Cardoso, supra note 117, at 21 (noting that
countries lacking the expertise to enforce capital controls will not be able to use them
effectively).
263. See Cardoso & Goldfajn, supra note 254, at 167; Laurens & Cardoso, supra
note 117, at 19-21.
264. Cf. Cardoso & Goldfajn, supra note 254, at 166-68. Even trade credits might
have to be subject to capital controls, as their exemption has been shown to reduce
the effectiveness of a URR-type regime. Id. Colombia achieved success with its URR
while extending it to cover trade credits. Id.
265. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 17.
266. See id.
267. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 892 (arguing that capital controls should
reduce the risk of foreign capital in the most efficient way possible).
268. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 13.
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inducing stability did not, by and large, implement extensive
prudential reform before opening their capital accounts. - 1'
Before capital controls can be effective, proper administration must
be in place.27 More than just a measure related to capital control
effectiveness, prudential regulations and capital controls can replicate
and reinforce the effects of each other. Strengthening prudential
regulations can reduce capital inflows.'- "More restrictive systems of
domestic regulations tend to be associated with fewer controls on
inflows and outflows... suggesting some substitution between an
effective system of domestic regulation and the need to resort to
capital controls. ' 27 Prudential regulations generally function to limit
the risk vulnerability of the financial system, similar to one of the
functions of capital controls.2
The Asian crisis accelerated appreciation of the importance of
prudential regulations in managing the risks of volatile capital flows
and increasing the health of financial intermediaries. ' 4  Prudential
regulations and supervision force financial institutions to manage
external risk more effectively, and this reduces the volatility of foreign
inflows." In many LDCs, banks are the primary means of channeling
foreign inflows, so prudential limits on bank activity can have an
especially effective impact.2 6 While prudential measures on banks are
being implemented and bank managers are learning to work within
their parameters, capital controls can operate as an immediately
effective limitation on banks' risk-taking activities."
A discussion of two countries' experiences using capital controls
will demonstrate how they can work to reduce instability, provided
the necessary conditions are in place.
2. Chile's Experience with Capital Controls
The most substantial information on the effectiveness of capital
controls comes from the experience of Chile. -8 Starting in 1991, Chile
269. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 52.
270. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 893.
271. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 17.
272. Johnston & Tamirisa, supra note 85, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
273. See Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6. at 70, Ariyoshi, supra note 87,
at 32; Laurens & Cardoso, supra note 117, at 19-21.
274. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 32. "[Financial institutions are prone to
excessive risk-taking," and prudential regulations can increase effective risk
management, and thereby "dampen transmission and contagion, and contribute to
stemming the development of a major financial crisis." Id.
275. Ld.
276. See id
277. This assumes that the capital controls are implemented in an effective way
(i.e., with sufficient administrative and enforcement capacity and sufficient breadth).
See id. at 33.
278. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1626 (discussing
the "enthusiastic attention" given to Chile's capital-control regime, while
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adopted the following measures: a selective URR of 20% on certain
investments, a minimum-stay requirement for both direct and
portfolio investment, regulatory requirements on corporations
borrowing abroad, and extensive reporting requirements for banks on
all capital transactions. 79 The URR was intended to encourage equity
rather than debt financing, and long-term rather than short-term
investments. 280 The URR initially covered one-half of gross inflows,
but coverage eventually declined to 24% of inflows. 28'
From 1990 to 1998, short-term debt as a proportion of total Chilean
debt fell from 25% to 12%.1 Coverage of the URR was extended to
nondebt flows that were potential conduits for speculative
investments, such as foreign currency deposits, secondary depository
receipts and FDI of a potentially speculative nature. The rate of the
URR was raised to 30% and then eventually lowered to 0% in 1998,
once the Asian crisis caused most inflows to LDCs to dry up.283
Before implementing these controls, the government had already
begun to improve prudential regulations in the early 1980s with a
thorough revision of the general banking law.8 This involved "higher
disclosure standards; stringent rules for loan classification and
provisioning; strict limits on connected lending and on banks'
exposure to foreign exchange risk;... clear procedures for the
correction of liquidity or solvency problems;" a capital adequacy ratio
of 11.5%; a targeting of connected lending; and minimum rating
requirements for all companies borrowing in international capital
markets.85
No absolute conclusions on the effectiveness of Chile's capital
controls can be drawn.286 The general consensus on Chile's capital
controls, however, agrees that they did in fact change the maturity
composition of capital inflows, regardless of whether the actual
volume of inflows was affected.' Empirical research has differed
characterizing it as "relatively modest").
279. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 47; see also Terrill, supra note 92, at 312 (discussing
the capital controls implemented by Chile).
280. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 70 (characterizing the URR as an "asymmetric
Tobin tax"). The URR puts a higher implicit cost on a shorter term inflow-its cost
decreases with the length of the stay. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 76.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 72-73; see also Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6, at 70.
285. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 47, 73.
286. But see Terrill, supra note 92, at 312 (stating that the result of Chile's capital
control program "was a steep initial decline in the amount of short-term capital flows
in and out of Chile" (emphasis added)).
287. Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 48; Cardoso & Goldfajn, supra note 254, at 166-67;
Laurens & Cardoso, supra note 117, at 19-20; see also Eichengreen, Taming Capital
Flows. supra note 48, at 14 (citing further unpublished evidence that the no-volume
"objection can be dismissed on the grounds that the goal was never to limit the level
of foreign borrowing but to alter its average maturity, and on the maturity front the
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over whether this maturity composition effect lasted over the long-
term.2' As the effects of the Asian crisis have been more closely
dissected, it appears that more economists and policymakers have
been forced to acknowledge that the maturity effect by itself helped
reduce instability.2 9  But regardless of how the maturity/volume
debate is finally settled, some research does suggest that Chile's
controls experienced some volume reduction "on impact."- "
Critics of Chile's URR typically admit that the measure did alter
maturity composition, but stress that it failed to lower the overall
volume of inflows, and was therefore ineffective. -" One author
advances an interesting argument recently used to counter this
critique.292 Controls can be shown to effectively reduce a country's
vulnerability to financial contagion, and this can encourage a higher
volume of inflows of a more stable nature.213 "If the supply of capital
to emerging markets depends on the vulnerability of these markets to
financial crises, capital controls that make these markets less
vulnerable should, certeris paribus, 294 increase the supply of capital."'
When viewed in light of this argument, findings that capital controls
do not reduce investment inflow volume "corroborate... the view
that short-term capital controls can be effective instruments in
reducing the vulnerability of such markets to financial crises."'
evidence is compelling"). Chile's URR has also been lauded as "transparent and
insulated from administrative discretion." Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra
note 48, at 13.
288. See, e.g., Laurens & Cardoso, supra note 117 (discussing other researchers'
findings of a long-term maturity effect, but showing only a temporary maturity
composition effect in their study).
289. See Cordella, supra note 194, at 4 ("'Even critics of the Chilean system
acknowledge that the reserve requirement has significantly lengthened the maturity
composition of capital inflows to Chile. This... may be the reason that Chile has
been relatively unaffected by recent financial crises."' (quoting Joseph Stiglitz, Boats,
Planes and Capital Flows, Fin. Times, Mar. 25, 1998)).
290. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 48. Also, volume can effectively be reduced by
implementing outflow controls, whose effect in Malaysia, as discussed below, was to
make many investors shy away from the country. See infra Part lIl.A.3.
291. See Cordella, supra note 194, at 4 (discussing criticism of Chile's controls in
Sebastian Edwards, The Americas: Capital Controls Are Not the Reason for Chile s
Success, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1998). There is also clear evidence that Colombia's URR
effectively altered the maturity profile of foreign capital inflows. See Ariyoshi, supra
note 87, at 48-49.
292. See Cordella, supra note 194, at 4.
293. See id. at 4-5. Cordella argues that capital controls improve stability by raising
the price to the investor of a panicked withdrawal, which in turn raises the expected
return of keeping the investment in the country, even though market uncertainty has
increased. Id. at 9 ("Taxes on short-term capital ... reduce the probability of bank
runs, and.... [thereby] increase the volume of foreign investments.").
294. Ceteris paribus is "Latin for 'other things being equal.' This means that other
things that could change are for the moment being assumed not to." Black, supra note
38, at 58.
295. Cordella, supra note 194, at 9.
296. Id. at 3.
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Most empirical literature suggests some effectiveness of Chile's
capital controls, but emphasizes that the URR does not provide a
"lasting solution to [the problems posed by] short-term... inflows."2"
The development of a prudential framework is the essential
component for long-term stabilization. 8 The literature further states
that a high level of enforcement capacity is necessary to make the
capital controls effective.299  This reinforces the observation that
capital controls on short-term investments are most effective and most
necessary in emerging market economies at a relatively higher level of
development, which are the most attractive to foreign investment, but
whose regulatory framework has not yet developed the necessary
capacity.
The most commonly cited problems with Chile's URR typically
start with the fact that it only provided partial coverage of short-term
inflows, and particularly that it did not cover trade credits, which were
covered by Colombia's URR, and which served as one of the prime
loopholes in Chile's URR regime.3" Another often-discussed
problem with Chile's URR is the sophistication of Chile's financial
system relative to the government's enforcement capacity.01 But as
one author retorts, paraphrasing Chile's finance minister, "'[i]f these
capital-import taxes are so easily evaded, then why do we have so
many non-interest-bearing foreign deposits at the central bank?"'3
3. Malaysia's Experience with Capital Controls
While Chile's capital control measures have been thoroughly
investigated by economic researchers, the same cannot be said of
Malaysia's controls on capital outflows implemented in 1998.03
Chile's capital control program was a forward-thinking, proactive
policy that tried to remedy the problem of excessive inflows before
they became destabilizing. Malaysia's 1998 capital controls, on the
other hand, were a reaction to an immediate crisis and differed
radically in their approach. Because Malaysia only recently
implemented this program of capital controls, it is too soon to draw
many conclusions about their effectiveness.
Malaysia's implementation of a capital-control regime in 1998, in
the midst of the Asian crisis, brought the brewing debate over capital
controls to the center of attention.3" While Malaysia's controls
297. Laurens & Cardoso, supra note 117, at 20.
298. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 47-48 (citing Chile's early recognition of the
importance and early implementation of financial sector prudential reforms).
299. See id. at 48.
300. Id.
301. See id.
302. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 14.
303. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 28.
304. When Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, denounced currency
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differed dramatically from Chile's,' -5 a comparison sheds light on how
LDCs use capital controls in different situations. Malaysia's controls
were more directly targeted at transactions that were vehicles of
speculation and were also emergency measures to stem outflows,;4 'b
while Chile's capital-control regime was developed to retard
inflows.30
The 1998 emergency controls came at a time when Malaysia had
substantially liberalized its capital account."° When the Asian crisis
spread to its shores, Malaysia adopted a strict capital control program,
targeted at outflows of speculative investments." The primary
concern was the stability of the country's exchange rate, which was on
a managed-float regime?'0 Malaysia sought to prevent a financial
market decline that would surely follow a fall in the currency, as had
already happened in Thailand, Korea and Indonesia."' Using capital
controls to stabilize the currency allowed Malaysia to keep interest
rates low. 312 Lower interest rates put less pressure on domestic banks
and helped save the country from the huge number of bank failures
experienced in Korea and Indonesia.3  Malaysia's capital controls
have also made cleaning up the banking sector easier through interest
rate cuts and exchange rate stability.314
Malaysia's capital outflow controls have generally been assessed as
effective.315 Malaysia eliminated the offshore ringgit (the Malaysian
currency) market and succeeded in stemming outflows.-"' This
program showed that eliminating the offshore currency market is the
most important element of a capital outflow control regime.'" These
outflow controls also significantly contributed to the stabilization of
speculators in general, and George Soros in particular, the world's attention was
drawn to the subject of capital controls. See e.g., Terrill, supra note 92, at 314
(discussing Prime Minister Mahathir's comments).
305. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reforn, supra note 82, at 1627
(characterizing Malaysia's capital controls as surpassing Chile's in breadth).
306. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 18.
307. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 313-14 (noting that Malaysia's controls were
directly targeted at certain types of transactions).
30& Id. at 312.
309. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. Dec. 1998, at 22.
310. See id
311. See id.
312. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 17.
313. Keeping interest rates low may have reduced the number of nonperforming
loans, thereby reducing the number of bank failures in Malaysia, which in turn
reduced the cost of recapitalizing the banking sector after the crisis had passed. See id.
at 100 & n.103 (discussing Standard & Poor's assessment that nonperforming loans
would have been much greater had the interest rate not been kept low in Malaysia).
314. See id. at 100.
315. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Oct. 1999, at 54-
55.
316. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 24.
317. See id at 28.
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the exchange rate.318 No more signs of speculative pressure on the
currency have appeared, which has allowed Malaysia to use loose
monetary and fiscal policy to mitigate the far-reaching effects of the
crisis.319 Significantly, no major signs of "circumvention efforts have
been reported.""32 The main benefit of the controls was to give the
country a temporary respite from the destabilizing outflows. 2' This
gave the country time to implement further banking reforms,322 and
also assuaged domestic businesses by establishing greater stability. 3
Another important element of Malaysia's program was its
transparency. The government clearly indicated the nature, scope and
reasons for the controls. 24 Also critical were concomitant efforts to
improve financial regulations. This seemed to help the "acceptability
of the measures both domestically and internationally. ' 315
The long-term impact of the capital-control regime on investor
confidence remains to be seen, but there were demonstrably negative
investor reactions in the short-term.326 Even though outflows on FDI
are not covered by the controls, investors are still cautious, needing
time to make sure that FDI is not covered and to confirm that
Malaysia will not soon extend coverage of the outflow restrictions to
FDI1. 27 This demonstrates the need to publicize the reasons behind
any control program and its extent.3 8 The major cost of Malaysia's
capital outflow controls has been the higher risk premium demanded
by the market than elsewhere in Asia for investment in the country. 9
Although Malaysia's capital controls brought a measure of stability
to the economy in the midst of a financial crisis, such outflow controls
318. See id. at 24.
319. Id. at 24-25.
320. Id. at 25.
321. See id. at 28.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 54.
324. See id. at 28, 54.
325. Id. at 28.
326. See id. But see Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1628
(noting that Malaysia has used the "breathing space provided by its exchange controls
[to] slowly bring back foreign investors" (citation omitted)).
327. See Ariyoshi, supra note 87, at 102.
328. This education of investors is, however, costly to both the government and
investors, in the sense that informing investors about the intricacies of such a capital
control regime requires extensive time and effort. See id.
329. See id. at 54-55. This discrimination, albeit rational, when combined with the
fact that Malaysia had a better banking system before the crisis, Asia's Economies: On
Their Feet Again?, supra note 58, at 17; see also L6pez-Mejfa, supra note 137, at 42
(discussing Malaysia's efforts to "strengthen[] [its] banking system[] during the capital
inflow and lending boom period"), and felt itself undeserving of the market's herding
behavior and indiscriminate withdrawal, particularly galls Malaysians and enhances
the anti-foreign, anti-market sentiment fanned by Prime Minister Mahathir's
inflammatory comments. See Keeping the Hot Money Out, supra note 6, at 69
(quoting Prime Minister Mahathir as "liken[ing] the global capital markets to 'a
jungle of ferocious beasts').
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are generally less effective than a program of prudential regulations
and capital controls on inflows. In the final analysis, "the case for
taxing outflows is weaker than taxing inflows because the former
merely treats the symptom rather than the cause of the problem."3 "
B. Non-Economic Justifications for Capital Controls
Broader social welfare and sovereignty concerns also weigh in favor
of LDCs using capital controls. Financial instability has a higher
human cost in LDCs than in industrialized nations, which have more
generous social safety nets to absorb the shock of economic
turbulence. LDCs, moreover, cede much of their ability to determine
their own economic future by liberalizing their capital accounts
prematurely. This section contends that both of these non-economic
arguments justify using capital controls in LDCs.
1. Protection against Instability and Inefficient Investment
By and large, the primary motive for implementing capital controls
is to reduce instability. This is more than just an economic goal in
light of the grave human cost of financial volatility in LDCs.33' A
moral responsibility falls on governments to provide some measure of
protection against such traumatic shifts in market sentiment.
Sovereignty concerns332 also come into play: Entire countries should
not have to suffer a dramatically and precipitously reduced standard
of living because foreign investors couldn't be bothered to do their
"homework" and got skittish.33 Capital controls are a primary means
of reducing instability available to LDCs.
Some authors argue that economics is really free-market ideology
masquerading as a hard science, and that much of neoclassical
economics' theories are unprovable and therefore also irrefutable in
economic terms.334 The economist's measure of progress has been
called amoral because it ignores the human cost of liberalization."
These conclusions lead commentators to look for non-economic as
well as economic justifications for capital controls.
330. Zee, supra note 197, at 6 n.11 (citing Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New
International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda (Institute for
International Economics, 1999)).
331. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (illustrating the human cost of the
Asian financial crisis).
332. See infra Part III.B.2. (discussing sovereignty concerns).
333. With respect to foreign investors not doing their "homework," see the
discussion of "herding behavior," supra, in text accompanying notes 146-55.
334. Canova, Unrestricted Capital Mobility, supra note 183, at 219: Canova,
Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1285.
335. See Canova, Unrestricted Capital Mobility, supra note 183, at 229-30
("[Orthodox economist's] measure of success... is not just short-sighted and narrow,
but actually amoral in its studied neglect of the human suffering that results from the
neoliberal project." (footnote omitted)).
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Regardless of the motives for implementing capital controls, if
investment finds inefficient employ in a country experiencing large
inflows of foreign capital, the benefits of capital controls on capital
inflows will outweigh their costs. 336  Large capital inflows can
overwhelm regulatory officials' capacity to effectively supervise the
financial system, and might also be more than the private sector can
efficiently absorb.337 Misallocation of resources becomes rampant in
such a situation.338
For most of the past two decades, industrial nations and multilateral
institutions have been encouraging the liberalization of developing
countries' capital accounts as the default policy option.339  The
assumption of economists and policymakers in the industrialized
world is that "markets know better than governments.""-
Overcoming this assumption requires quite a bit of evidence.
341 If
industrialized and developing nations are going to work together to
confront the jarring instability of these two worlds' financial
interactions, this default approach will need to be changed. The
policy mindset in both developed countries and multinational
institutions must evolve. "For emerging markets, an open capital
account should be the exception, not the rule.
'342
The prevailing policy mindset has led the industrialized nations to
pressure LDCs to open their capital accounts before the steps needed
to liberalize and decontrol financial markets had been taken. 3  The
international community needs to recognize that it jumped the gun in
pressuring premature liberalization. But, the "Washington
Consensus"' suspects that capital controls will only lead to more
regulation,345 rather than being a step on the way to an orderly
liberalization of the capital account. The IMF Articles of
Agreement 6 allow the use of capital controls, 47 but the IMF has
336. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 876 (arguing that when investment is used
productively its benefits to the capital importer outweigh its costs).
337. Id. at 862 & n.20.
338. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 4.
339. See id.; McKnight, supra note 95, at 863; see also International Monetary
Fund, World Economic Outlook, Oct. 1998, at 80 (advocating the superiority of free
capital movement).
340. See Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 2.
341. Id. at 4.
342. Id. at 8.
343. See id.
344. "[A] ... networking of like-minded luminaries among the powerful
institutions-Wall Street, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the IMF,
and the World Bank... [which] is unable to look much beyond the interest of Wall
Street, which it equates with the good of the world." Bhagwati, supra note 130, at 11-
12.
345. See McKnight, supra note 95, at 863.
346. The IMF Articles of Agreement govern the operations of the IMF and
compliance with the Articles is a prerequisite to receiving assistance from the IMF.
347. See IMF Articles of Agreement art. VI, § 3.
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advocated their use only in dire balance of payment situations, and
only tepidly at that.348 The difficult reality of liberalizing the capital
account becomes more apparent when one considers that Europe and
Japan both have only recently abandoned fairly extensive capital
controls, and the latter only begrudgingly. -49
This kind of market intervention should not be considered as in
conflict with the ultimate goal of free markets and financial
liberalization. "Liberalization is not an all-or-nothing process:
Measures that are appropriate for a country at one level of
development are not appropriate for countries at another level."3'
Capital controls play an important role in correcting market
imperfections and operate as a step towards allowing markets to
function freely. A country imposing a legal regime of capital controls
must, however, be clear about what that goal is, or markets will lose
confidence in the country, and the controls will also risk outliving
their usefulness.
Some argue that capital controls such as taxes and quantitative
measures should only be imposed where other prudential measures
have been tried but have been ineffective.35" ' But the financial crises in
LDCs in the 1990s have taught us nothing if not that capital controls
need to be in place before instability hits. The experience in Chile
and Malaysia with capital controls shows that the distortion from
controls has a lower cost than instability. There is no need to wait for
a crisis to begin to calculate the costs and benefits. "After Mexico in
1994 and Asia in 1997, do we really need a third reminder of the
dangers of premature and precipitous financial liberalization? 35
2. Sovereignty Concerns
The modern notion of sovereignty intrinsically connotes a nation's
ability "to be the master of its own destiny.., in the economic
field. '353 Modern international law also recognizes a right of defensive
sovereignty to states-an "inalienable right to avoid being adversely
affected by decisions and events happening outside [a state's]
348. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Oct. 1999, at 54-
55 (discussing Malaysia's use of capital controls during the Asian financial crisis).
349. See Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 2; see also Canova,
Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1612 ("[Clapital controls were
widely used throughout Western Europe to shield those countries from speculative
capital flows during post-war reconstruction. In fact, for most Western European
countries, capital controls remained in place throughout most of the 1950s. and for
some countries until the early 1990s." (citations omitted)).
350. McKnight, supra note 95, at 864-65.
351. See, e.g., id at 892.
352. Eichengreen, Capital Controls, supra note 148, at 8.
353. Mary C. Tsai, Note, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of tie
Sovereignty Coin, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1317, 1319 (2000) (quoting lgnaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern, International Economic Law 22 (3d ed. 1999)).
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jurisdiction." '354 States' ability to determine their own economic
sovereignty faces a serious challenge from globalization and the
increasing mobility of capital.355 The further industrialized nations
press LDCs to liberalize their capital accounts, the more LDCs will
relinquish their economic and defensive sovereignty.356
As the contagion effect of the Asian financial crisis demonstrated,
nations' ability to maintain their own economic goals and shield their
economy from the influences of the larger world have greatly
diminished. In the face of this growing inability to stave off
financial contagion, nations will exercise whatever means they have to
protect their economic sovereignty. The industrialized world should
recognize this and allow LDCs to employ capital controls as a means
of shielding their economic self-determination.
But rather than ensuring the sovereign economic integrity of LDCs,
the industrialized world has pressured them to liberalize cross-border
financial transactions.-" 8 The IMF and other multilateral institutions
seek to bolster LDCs' ability to withstand financial contagion by
encouraging the development of open markets.3 9  Not allowing
countries to use capital controls to protect themselves from financial
contagion appears, however, to actually weaken countries' economic
and defensive sovereignty.3 6 While the West also actively encourages
the development of democracy in LDCs, the policy of simultaneously
encouraging open markets may paradoxically counteract democratic
advances in LDCs.3 61 Some commentators argue that free markets
must take a backseat to democracy until the social and cultural
354. Id. at 1318.
355. See id. at 1329 (noting that "[gilobal economic integration" pushes nations to
participate in the global economy whether they want to or not).
356. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1602 (discussing
Mexico's loss of its economic self-determination when it relinquished control over
short-term capital flows).
357. Tsai, supra note 353, at 1325 (noting that the Asian crisis spread to several
disparate nations, and that "[w]hat began as a simple recession in Thailand turned
into one of the worst global economic disasters in history").
358. See infra Part IV.
359. Tsai, supra note 353, at 1326.
360. Id.
361. See Canova, Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1280 (arguing that
financial liberalization has created an "undemocratic check on once-sovereign nation-
states to pursue progressive social and economic policies"); Amy L. Chua, The
Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 287 (2000) (discussing the inherent conflict between free markets and democracy
and noting that the West has developed institutions to mediate the conflict between
the two that LDCs have yet to acquire); Chantal Thomas, Does the "Good
Governance Policy" of the International Financial Institutions Privilege Markets at the
Expense of Democracy?, 14 Conn. J. Int'l L. 551 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Good
Governance Policy] (arguing that "good governance policy" requirements in IMF
conditionality encroach on the economic sovereignty of LDCs and privilege free
market mechanisms at the expense of redistributive choices of the democratic
process).
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institutions needed to mediate the inherent conflict between the two
have evolved.36
Rapid financial liberalization and austerity measures imposed on
LDCs under IMF tutelage has provoked a rash of criticism. Many
commentators argue that "it is an ultra vires act of international law
for the IMF to exercise financial, economic, and ultimately social
policy leverage over [LDC's] domestic affairs." When the IMF
reaches beyond its multilateral mandate, it violates the national
sovereignty of LDC members.3 6
In light of this evidence of the potential for capital controls to
reduce instability in LDCs' economies, the international legal regime
that governs capital controls appears sub-optimal. Although Western
nations have used various international legal institutions to encourage
rapid financial liberalization in LDCs, the current policies embodied
in international law allow the use of capital controls in these countries.
The next part argues that the Western nations should limit or reverse
their practice of inveigling LDCs into premature capital account
liberalization.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR THE CAPITAL
ACCOUNT AND THE IMF: WOULD AN ENHANCED MULTILATERAL
FRAMEWORK RATIONALIZE LDCs' USE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS?
This part begins by looking at the role of the IMF in encouraging
capital account liberalization in LDCs. Although the IMF is
prevented by the terms of its charter from imposing capital
liberalization on member LDCs through the terms of its
"conditionality" loans, the Fund has been a driving force in
encouraging LDCs to open their financial markets to free foreign
investment. This discussion of the IMF looks at proposals to reform
the Fund to allow it to push more overtly for capital account
liberalization in LDCs.
This part then looks at other multilateral institutions that make up
the international legal regime for the capital account and determines
that no multilateral institution has the authority to regulate LDCs' use
of capital controls. Finally, this part argues that this status quo should
remain unchanged and that neither the IMF nor any other multilateral
institution should have jurisdiction over capital controls in LDCs,
given the tendencies of existing multilateral institutions to favor the
objectives of developed countries over LDCs.
362. Chua, supra note 361, at 308-38.
363. Anthony Galano III, Comment, International Monetary Fund Response to the
Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undernined Brazil's
National Sovereignty?, 6 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 323, 324 (1994).
364. Id.
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A. IMF Reform
The IMF was created in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,
as a multilateral agency to oversee member nations' conduct of
monetary policy, to monitor a fixed-exchange-rate regime established
by the signatories, and to lend financial assistance to countries facing
currency problems.365 Since 1944, the IMF has evolved to take on
roles that differ from what its founders envisioned, a development
that has provoked a great deal of criticism.
As international political-economic problems have become more
complex and interrelated, the IMF has taken on a more active-and
very different role-as a negotiator for LDC debt restructuring and as
a "'lender of last resort' for the indebted [LDCs]. ' 36  Much of the
criticism of the IMF can be linked to the fact that the institution is
now called on to perform often-contradictory functions never
anticipated at the time of its organization. 67 In recent years, a swirl of
ideas to reform the IMF has circulated all over the world.3" Most
reform ideas seek to solidify the international financial system to ward
off destabilizing financial crises such as that in Asia.3 69 Many authors
have called for a regional IMF in Asia that would be a more
sympathetic figure to handle such regional crises.37° Others have
suggested new international financial institutions and a new
international legal regime.371
For the foreseeable future, however, such arguments will remain on
the fringe.3 72  Given the divide between industrialized nations and
LDCs on the timing and celerity at which capital-account
liberalization should proceed, a new multilateral arrangement is
unlikely to happen any time soon.373 Pragmatic reform of the
365. Lichtenstein, supra note 194, at 807 (describing the original role of the IMF).
366. Galano, supra note 363, at 337; see also Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payment
Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the
New Economic Order, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1249, 1263 (2000) [hereinafter Thomas,
Balance of Payment Crises].
367. See Anghie, supra note 192, at 264-65; Jerome I. Levinson, The International
Financial System: A Flawed Architecture, 23 Fletcher F. World Aff. 1, 39-40 (1999).
368. For a good synopsis of many of the criticisms of the IMF, see Taylor, supra
note 43, at 86-87.
369. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank)?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1989 (1994) (arguing for a renovation of the
international financial architecture by merging the IMF and the World Bank);
Francois Gianviti, The Reform of the International Monetary Fund (Conditionality and
Surveillance), 34 Int'l Law. 107, 108 (2000).
370. See, e.g., Gyohten, supra note 180, at 374.
371. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 72, at 530.
372. See Lichtenstein, supra note 194, at 810-11 (deriding "the unedifying sight of
academics criticizing the Fund's approach," and suggesting that such limitless and
unpragmatic criticism impedes the development of an international consensus on IMF
reform).
373. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 17 ("There is not
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institutions already existing, starting with the IMF, would more likely
achieve wider acceptance of LDCs' use of capital controls as
prudential measures. 4
The IMF "plays an active role in promoting the liberalization of
capital movements," but "the mechanisms presently available to the
Fund for this purpose are... limited."3" The Fund's Articles of
Agreement currently permit the use of capital controls. 6 When the
IMF's Articles of Agreement were drafted in 1944, "much greater
emphasis [was placed] on liberalization of payments and transfers
associated with international trade in goods and services, or current
international transactions[,]' than... on capital movements."'' J.M.
Keynes, one of the negotiators of the Bretton Woods agreement,
envisioned article VI as a means of preventing exactly the kind of
capital mobility the IMF now seeks to encourage. 3"1 Keynes described
article VI as "a permanent arrangement [that] accords to every
member government the explicit right to control all capital
movements.... [I]t follows that our right to control the domestic
capital market is secured on [a] firmer foundation than ever
before." '379 This limited ability of the Fund to insist on capital account
liberalization explains why it pushes so aggressively for removal of
capital controls when it makes an agreement for assistance with a
member.30
A few capital movements are required to be liberalized under the
obligations in article VIII, but "[p]ayments and transfers associated
with international capital transactions fall largely outside the scope"
of this provision." Each member can implement measures
restraining the flow of international capital transactions across its
borders, provided it "does not restrict or unduly delay the making of
going to be radical reform resulting in dramatic changes in the international financial
landscape.").
374. Many call for an abolition of the IMF, see Terrill, supra note 92, at 315-16, but
such a drastic step is clearly a far-off prospect. See id. at 317 (discussing support for
the IMF).
375. Leckow, supra note 7, at 517.
376. See Watanabe, supra note 103, at 10-11, Canova, Banking and Financial
Reform, supra note 82, at 1610. Most IMF members used capital controls throughout
the post-war period. See Watanabe, supra note 103, at 3 & n.8.
377. Leckow, supra note 7, at 518.
378. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1611.
379. John M. Keynes, unattributed (quoted in Canova, Banking and Financial
Reform, supra note 82, at 1612).
380. The IMF cannot use conditionality agreements to force countries to open their
capital accounts. Gianviti, supra note 369, at 112-13. "At the behest of creditor
countries, [however,] the scope of [IMF] conditionality has gradually expanded." Id.
at 114.
381. Leckow, supra note 7, at 520. Capital movements that the IMF's Articles of
Agreement require to be liberalized include "payments of [a] moderate amount for
the amortization of loans or for the depreciation of direct investments and normal
short-term banking and credit facilities." Id. at 521.
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payments or transfers for current international transactions. ''311 This
provision allows countries the leeway needed to prevent destabilizing
short-term inflows. Article VI section 1 recognizes the usefulness of
capital controls in crisis situations, and gives the IMF the authority to
require a member to impose controls on capital movements to prevent
a "large or sustained outflow of capital. '" 383
The Articles of Agreement do not allow the IMF to use
conditionality3 4 and Fund assistance to force open a country's capital
account.385 This potentially overwhelming bargaining tool is not
available to unlimited use by the Fund because the Articles require
that "any conditions imposed by the Fund on the use of its resources
by members must be consistent with the purposes of the Fund.
1 3 6
While the IMF cannot require capital account liberalization, this does
not stop it from pressuring countries to include capital control
removal in reform packages, or when advising countries.", Countries
accept the onerous terms of conditionality because following them not
only gives access to IMF funds, but also gives a country the IMF "seal
of approval" that encourages private international capital to flow into
the country.311 The importance of conforming to the Fund's advice
gives it significant authority, in practice, over countries' decisions to
eliminate capital controls.
The terms of conditionality currently permitted by the IMF charter
are often onerous and force countries to cut back spending on a
variety of domestic programs. 9  IMF conditionality often requires
LDCs to cut back on their social safety nets, "programs that the poor,
women, children, and other vulnerable groups heavily rel[y] on-e.g.,
food subsidies, health care, and education. '390  In the wake of the
Asian financial crisis, the IMF has allowed more spending on food
subsidies, and the like,39 1 but austerity is still a key part of
conditionality. While the IMF is softening its rigid doctrine on the
382. Id. at 520-21.
383. Id. at 521.
384. See Galano, supra note 363, at 338-39 ("'Conditionality [is] understood as
being the policies the Fund expects a member country to follow in order to be able to
use the Fund's general resources."' (citations omitted)); Tsai, supra note 353, at 1321
(defining and discussing conditionality).
385. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 521-22; see supra note 380.
386. Leckow, supra note 7, at 521-22. The Fund cannot therefore "establish
conditionality which would require members receiving financial assistance to remove
particular capital account restrictions." Id. at 522.
387. See Gianviti, supra note 369, at 112.
388. See Galano, supra note 363, at 339.
389. "Many critics have claimed that the IMF has placed most of the burdens of
market-based adjustment on vulnerable groups in member countries." Nicole Wendt,
Citizens, National Governments, and International Financial Institutions: Changing
Conceptions of Development in the 1990s, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 165, 166
(1999).
390. See id. at 166-67.
391. Id. at 167.
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terms of its conditionality programs,3 92 many of the Fund's critics
argue that conditionality terms still do not serve all, or even most, of
the interests in an LDC's society. Despite the improvements in IMF
policies towards the social safety net in LDCs, it is nevertheless true
that
the treatment of such a broad range of public activity as properly
managed by economic experts rather than by the people, however
conceived, suggests such institutions are committed to a very limited
model of procedural democracy. The means chosen to achieve [the]
end of market liberalization often infringe on the right to self-
determination or democratic governance understood in substantive
terms.
393
The policies of market liberalization are often justified as bringing
greater democracy and self-determination to people in LDCs, but the
analytical models underlying these policies often assume that
substantive democracy and access to the benefits of enhanced
economic activity are already in place." Given the questionable
impact of conditionality on the democratic and social structures of
LDCs, the international community should hesitate before giving the
IMF another method of twisting the arm of LDCs' social and
economic policies.
In 1997, the IMF's Interim Committee called for an amendment to
the Articles of Agreement that would allow the Fund to require
capital account liberalization.95 Even after the onset of the Asian
financial crisis, in the spring of 1998, the IMF still actively sought
"explicit jurisdiction over the process of capital account
liberalization. 3 96  The Committee's report recognized that
"[s]afeguards and transitional arrangements are necessary, '3w but it
failed to recognize the great length of time needed to put a sound
regulatory structure in place.
Such an amendment would undoubtedly require a repeal of article
VI section 3,398 removing LDCs' major hold-out to the onslaught of
liberalization pressure from the developed countries. This
amendment would be a legally binding requirement on countries to
remove restrictions on capital movements, allowing only for narrowly
392. See Thomas, Good Governance Policy, supra note 361, at 560 ("By the early
1990s, the [international financial institutions] had moved significantly towards
publicly and explicitly recognizing that basic individual and social needs could not be
ignored without serious jeopardy to economic goals.").
393. Anne Orford, Locating the International. Ailitary' and Monetary Interventions
After the Cold War, 38 Harv. Int'l L.J. 443, 468 (1997).
394. Id. at 469.
395. Leckow, supra note 7, at 522.
396. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reforn, supra note 82, at 1613.
397. Leckow, supra note 7, at 522 (citation omitted).
398. Id. at 524; see Canova. Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1610-
13.
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defined exceptions." Repeal of article VI would ostensibly represent
a mandate from the entire IMF membership to pursue capital account
liberalization. 4' Even in the absence of such a consensus, however,
the IMF has "effectively pushed capital liberalization through its
surveillance, financing, and technical assistance activities. 40 1
Armed with this new regime, the IMF could freely use
conditionality to force members to liberalize their capital accounts.: 2
This would destabilize emerging markets, as the Fund currently
recognizes only balance of payments and traditionally acknowledged
sovereignty issues as sufficient to warrant capital controls.:° Until the
IMF explicitly accepts prudential concerns and proactive use of capital
controls to stabilize financial systems, a repeal of article VI would
eliminate one of LDCs' best means of economic self-determination. 4
The Fund has recognized that "[p]rovision could also be made for
Fund approval of restrictions imposed for other reasons-in
particular, for reasons of national security and for prudential
reasons."
405
The evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of capital controls
implemented to meet prudential concerns is strong and applies
broadly across the developing world.4° While the IMF modestly
supports limited capital controls in the short-run, a substantial
expansion of its jurisdiction in this area would likely encourage the
Fund to press for less use of capital controls in LDCs. 4 7 Given the
steps the IMF has taken to increase capital mobility even with the
constraint of article VI,40 8 the Fund would likely continue this policy
with even ardent pursuit. While under the proposed amendment the
IMF would ostensibly allow countries to use capital controls in some
situations,4 9 it would not likely approve such departures from its
ideology with alacrity. It would be a mistake to require LDCs to wait
for IMF approval before implementing capital controls. As its widely
criticized mistakes in Asia demonstrate, the Fund's indecision can
sometimes be very costly.410
399. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 524.
400. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1613.
401. Id.
402. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 524.
403. Id.
404. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 314-15 (noting that the proposed amendment
would eliminate most uses of capital controls).
405. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 526.
406. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the effectiveness of capital controls).
407. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 314-15.
408. See supra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing the IMF's use of its
current means to press for capital mobility).
409. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
410. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 316-17 (discussing criticism of the IMF's handling
of the Asian financial crisis).
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The Fund argues that this amendment is needed because "no
universal international organization... has jurisdiction over capital
transactions," and therefore there is no unified body of nations to
press for capital account liberalization.4" There is already ample
pressure from the developed world to liberalize capital flows,
however.41a If an international institution eventually has jurisdiction
to set the rules obliging countries to liberalize, it should not be the
IMF, where the United States alone has 17% of the votes and the
developed countries together have almost 60%." Such binding
decisions should be taken in a forum where each member has one
vote, such as the World Trade Organization ("WTO") system.4
Rather than follow this course of rapid liberalization, the IMF and
the international community should support the retention of capital
controls in countries whose financial systems have not improved up to
the level that is a prerequisite to sound liberalization of the capital
account. The Fund should not view capital controls as restrictions on
the inherently positive free flow of capital, but rather as necessary
prudential regulations that correct unavoidable problems in emerging
markets. Once the IMF acknowledges that capital controls should be
used in most LDCs, it can advocate for the soundest ways to limit
capital flows, like the URR or a withholding tax, and can help
countries train regulators to effectively supervise such controls. This
acknowledgement on the part of the IMF would improve its
reputation among its critics. Meeting LDCs halfway on this issue will
allow the Fund to work constructively with developing countries to
open their capital accounts in the best way.
The IMF should encourage countries to follow international
standards and codes of conduct in "prudential supervision, securities-
market regulation, auditing and accounting, bankruptcy and
insolvency procedures, and corporate governance," rather than on
imposing austerity measures.415 The Basle Committee of Banking
411. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 525.
412. See infra note 427 (discussing Western pressure on LDCs to liberalize their
capital accounts during bilateral investment treaty ("BIT") negotiations). The U.S.
and the U.K. have the most voting power in the IMF, which gives them the dominant
voice in the agency and affords these two countries great influence over the policies
and actions of the agency. Galano, supra note 363, at 335-36.
413. See IMF Art. of Agr., art. III § 1 & schedule A.
414. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.
Ix.
415. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 19-20; see also
Lichtenstein, supra note 194, at 821 (noting that "Fund conditionality.., does not aid
in the.., development of international norms of best practice banking, accounting
and financial market supervision"); Lawrence L. C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft
Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int'l L 1, 36-39
(1998) (arguing that the IMF should use its surveillance facility to encourage
adherence to the Basle Standards); Still Sick and Gloomy, Now Rebellious. supra note
4, at 41-42 (discussing the IMF austerity measures of forcing countries to tighten
budget deficits and keep interest rates high).
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Supervisors4 6 started this movement on international financial
standards, and other groups have set forth standards in their areas.
Such codes are, however, still being avoided as much as possible in
countries like Japan.4"7 Fuller adherence by the industrialized nations
would encourage adoption of and adherence to these measures in
LDCs. The IMF would better spend its resources by taking on a new
role as standards supervisor and enforcer in conjunction with its
article IV surveillance and review programs.'18 The IMF should
expand its role as a forum of real debate over regulation of
international capital markets, instead of remaining devoted to liberal
orthodoxy.4 19
The Interim Committee and IMF Board have already relaxed their
stance on capital account liberalization which peaked with the
proposed liberalization amendment.420 The proposed amendment has,
fortunately, fallen by the wayside.421 In another move signaling a shift
in the developed world's stance on capital controls in LDCs, the
United States government has even lent tentative support to the
URR. In 1999, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin endorsed the URR
as a potentially effective policy tool.422  Whether such comments
reflect a genuine shift in Western governments' attitudes toward
capital controls remains to be seen.42 Although several officials at the
IMF, the World Bank and other institutions have made similar
comments,424 no real change in the commitment to rapid liberalization
has yet to materialize. Strong U.S. support of short-term capital
controls for prudential reasons would, however, show that our
government favors a stable liberalization process, and that our main
goal is not to unleash hordes of financial imperialists and speculators
to colonize LDCs' banking and financial sectors.
416. See supra note 67 (discussing the Basle Committee).
417. Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 20.
418. See id. at 20-21.
419. See Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network- What Role (If
Any) for the IMP?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1953, 1970-71 (1994).
420. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 18. While the IMF
stepped back somewhat from its liberalization agenda during the worst of the Asian
financial crisis, its focus on liberalization has not fundamentally changed. Canova,
Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1284-85.
421. See Canova, Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1284.
422. See Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, supra note 48, at 18 (citing Stephen
Fidler, Rubin Says IMF Shouldn't Support Pegged-Exchange Policies, Fin. Times,
April 21, 1999, at Al).
423. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1624 (remarking
that each time officials of Western government make comments signaling such a shift
in attitude, they "quickly backpedal or even retract their earlier expressions of
misgivings about the dangerous direction of today's neoliberal policies").
424. Id. at 1622-23.
[Vol. 70
CAPITAL CONTROLS
B. The International Legal Regime for the Capital Account
The IMF is not the only multilateral institution with the potential
authority to restrict LDCs' use of capital controls. Other international
organizations could provide the forum for such jurisdiction. This
section looks at the other major multilateral economic institutions and
determines that none of them currently have jurisdiction over LDCs'
use of capital controls.
While the developed nations agree that capital account
liberalization is necessary to improve economic conditions, it is far
from clear that all LDCs share this view.4' Considering this lack of
consensus, "[t]here is [unsurprisingly] no international agreement
covering a majority of the world's countries which provides a
comprehensive set of rules defining the circumstances in which
restrictions on capital movements should be maintained or
removed."' 26  Instead, a patchwork of multilateral, regional and
bilateral agreements covers capital movements, but does not present a
"unified system for capital account liberalization."" One could
conclude from this arrangement that, rather than being ready for a
unified system, the world is far from a consensus about what
obligations should be imposed on countries at different levels of
development in order to build a unified agreement.
The OECD Code for the Liberalisation of Capital Movements
presents the "most comprehensive legal framework for capital
account liberalization."42s This agreement applies, of course, only to
OECD members, who have mostly already liberalized their capital
accounts. The Code "provides that signatories abolish all restrictions
to the free movement of capital, excepting those measures that
further: the protection of public order, health, morals, and safety;
essential security interests; and the fulfillment of international peace
and security obligations." '429 This agreement includes some safeguard
425. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, supra note 194, at 819-20 (discussing the consensus in
favor of liberalization, but failing to mention any institution representing LDCs that
favors this view); Terrill, supra note 92, at 307-14 (discussing LDCs' alternatives to
liberalization); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Symposiun on Implementation,
Compliance and Effectiveness: Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment
Regime, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 373, 375-90 (1998) (discussing the history and
development of the liberal consensus).
426. Leckow, supra note 7, at 523. When the IMF was established, short-term
capital flows were insignificant. This is partly why there is no multilateral institution
to deal with them. Zamora, supra note 419, at 1966.
427. Leckow, supra note 7, at 523; see also, Canova, Banking and Financial Reform,
supra note 82, at 1616-18 (noting that BITs predominate over multilateral
agreements, and arguing that the West uses BITs to strong-arm LDCs); Vandevelde,
supra note 425, at 395-97 (discussing predominance of BITs in regulating capital
movements between countries).
428. Leckow, supra note 7, at 523.
429. Geist, supra note 224, at 681.
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provisions for specific crisis situations,430 but does not include an
adequate level of protection for LDCs to serve as a starting point for a
unified legal framework.431  This agreement is appropriate for
developed countries, and may soon be for Mexico and Korea, once
financial system improvements take hold. 432 This agreement is not
appropriate, however, for countries like Indonesia and Thailand.433
The OECD's attempt to fashion a multilateral investment treaty,
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"), failed to bring
the industrialized nations to a consensus on the treatment of
international investments.4 4 If the developed world cannot reach a
consensus on the issue, a good deal of time will pass before nations at
all levels agree to a legal framework for capital account liberalization.
The MAI did include provisions recognizing the importance of
"temporary safeguard[s]," providing that treaty parties "may adopt or
maintain measures inconsistent with [their] obligations" to permit free
transfers of capital.435 These provisions allowed such suspension of
cross-border capital transactions only in the event of "serious balance-
of-payments... difficulties" or "serious difficulties for
macroeconomic management. '436 This provision means that capital
controls may only be implemented in a crisis situation, rather than as
preemptive measures.437  The treaty further provides that such
measures "shall be temporary and shall be eliminated as soon as
conditions permit." 438 The MAI also had the IMF serving as arbiter
of whether such controls are in fact necessary.439 As we have seen,
such restrictions should not be placed on LDCs-proactive use of
capital controls, while somewhat distortional, can improve financial
sector development.
430. See Leckow, supra note 7, at 522-23.
431. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1615-16 (noting
that the OECD liberalization measures would overturn IMF article VI protections for
signatories).
432. See id. at 1615 (noting risks for Mexico of implementing the OECD
liberalization standards).
433. Leckow, supra note 7, at 523.
434. See Gianviti, supra note 369, at 111-12 (noting that the failure of the MAI
highlights growing opposition to the principle that capital account liberalization
should soon be extended to LDCs); cf. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra
note 82, at 1616 (noting that "intense opposition by trade unions and environmental
groups forced the suspension of MAI negotiations due to their concerns regarding the
broad rights that MAI would grant to corporations to challenge national laws and
regulations"). For a general discussion of the MAI, see Stephen J. Canner, The
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 657 (1998).
435. Multinational Agreement on Investment, draft treaty, May 1998, annex 6, art.
2-1.
436. Id. annex 6, art. 2-1(a)-(b).
437. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1616 (arguing
that the MAI would have "effectively overturn[ed] Article VI of the IMF Articles [of
Agreement] on a grand multilateral scale").
438. Multinational Agreement on Investment, supra note 435, annex 6, art. 2(c).
439. See id. annex 6, art. 2-5(c)
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The MAI does permit the use of "prudential measures with respect
to financial services.., to ensure the integrity and stability of its
financial system," provided they do not serve as a means of avoiding
capital account liberalization.' If the developed world accepts the
use of capital controls on short-term investments in LDCs, such as a
URR or withholding tax, as a prudential measure, this treaty could
provide the starting point for a unified investment regime. LDCs will,
however, require that any potential agreement clearly articulate such
an understanding.
The international agreement actually in force that treats investment
in the largest number of countries is the General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS")."1 GATS is not designed primarily to stimulate
capital account liberalization. It merely "promote[s] the liberalization
of capital movements as a by-product of [another] principal goal,"
which is trade in services."2 Trade in services, unlike trade in visible
goods, requires some kind of presence in the target market for
effective delivery of the service. This can be the opening of a
subsidiary or a branch in the host country, for example. An
agreement that allows such a presence necessarily requires that
service providers be allowed some means of freely investing in the
target market. Under GATS, members are required to negotiate
concessions that are then extended to all parties to the agreement.
Article XIX recognizes the need for "appropriate flexibility.., for
opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, [and]
progressively extending market access in line with [countries']
development situation.""3 Financial services are, however, exempted
from the general GATS provisions on progressive liberalization, and
are subject only to specific concessions.' Any future multilateral
agreement on investment between developed and developing nations
will need stronger provisions recognizing the special situation of
LDCs with respect to capital account liberalization.
440. Id annex 6, art. 3.
441. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, reprinted in World Trade
Organization, the Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations 300 (Cambridge University Press. 2000) [hereinafter GATS];
Gianviti, supra note 369, at 111 (noting that GATS "contains provisions on the
liberalization of capital movements related to the provision of certain services").
GATS is primarily an offshoot of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), and some commentators consider it poor policy to link trade policies with
internal domestic goals, such as balance of payment stability and financial
liberalization, as this "undermine[s] both the trade order and the attainment of the
objectives in those nontrade policy areas." Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy
Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons fron the Past, 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l
Econ. L. 513, 514 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
442. Leckow, supra note 7, at 523.
443. GATS, supra note 441, art. XIX (2).
444. See id. art. I.
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While a multilateral agreement on investment would undoubtedly
make for a much more effective means of furthering capital account
liberalization, 445 negotiating large-scale liberalization on a world stage
might also give LDCs greater bargaining power than in bilateral
investment treaty ("BIT") negotiations with industrialized nations.446
If one accepts that the last multilateral effort at a liberalization regime
under the WTO auspices, the Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement ("TRIMs"), failed to accomplish anything substantive,447 it
would appear that an impasse exists between LDCs negotiating as a
block and the developed nations. Such a supposed impasse would
indicate the moment has yet to ripen for another such effort.
C. The Time Is Not Right for a New Multilateral Solution
This section analyzes the current nature and understanding of
multilateral institutions and determines that the solution to financial
instability in LDCs lies neither in giving jurisdiction over capital
controls to a new multilateral institution, nor in expanding the
authority of the IMF to manage capital controls.
Two counterbalancing problems need to be weighed when
considering whether a multilateral institution should gain jurisdiction
over capital controls: the danger of unregulated capital markets
versus countries' sacrifice of sovereignty to an international entity.
"[A] system of unregulated capital markets... has the potential to
undermine the governmental authority necessary to ensure sound
economies, in individual nations as well as in the world as a whole."44
And at the same time, "[t]rade and financial liberalization conducted
through multilateral and regional trade regimes has begun to limit the
degree to which people are able to shape the economic, social, and
cultural policies of their [own] governments."" 9  Given the often
negative ramifications of multilateral solutions on the poorest citizens
of LDCs,45° the regulation of capital mobility is, for the moment, best
carried out by individual nations. The current climate and evolution
of multilateral organizations does not portend a multilateral solution
responsive to the needs of LDCs' citizenry.
445. See Vandevelde, supra note 425, at 396-97 (arguing that a multilateral
agreement would "make a far greater contribution to promoting a sustainable
liberalism").
446. See Canova, Banking and Financial Reform, supra note 82, at 1616-18 (noting
that BIT negotiations produce lopsided results favoring capital exporting nations).
447. See Paul Civello, Note, The TRIMs Agreement: A Failed Attempt at Investment
Liberalization, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 97 (1999).
448. Zamora, supra note 419, at 1973.
449. Orford, supra note 393, at 471.
450. See supra notes 389-94 and accompanying text (discussing the negative impact
on the poor of IMF conditionality policies).
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1. Expanding "Supranational Authority" of Multilateral
Organizations and Lessening Concern for the Specific Circumstances
of LDCs
The debate over whether countries should use capital controls
logically leads to a discussion of whether an international institution
"should have the ability to assist or sanction a country's imposition of
capital controls.""45 International organizations do not usually have
explicit "supranational powers," but over time "'they gain ...
institutional strength... that enables them to influence the behavior
of individual [nation] states to a significant degree,"' thus enabling
them to become autonomous actors in the "international political-
economic system along with nation states."4" International
organizations have a propensity to "expand their jurisdiction,"4 and
to become autonomous agents with "supranational authority." Given
these tendencies, the international community must carefully consider
how a new agency will expand its authority over time and which
members will dominate it.
At the same time that their jurisdiction naturally expands, the
current international economic law of these multilateral institutions
has "moved away from a relative acceptance of 'special and
differential treatment' for developing countries, and towards a relative
intolerance of that principle."4" This shift became most apparent
when in 1986, "[d]uring the Uruguay Round of [GATT] negotiations,
leading voices representing the industrialized and developing worlds
moved away from an emphasis on special and differential treatment
towards a stronger commitment to bringing developing countries fully
within GATT discipline." "5 5 The paradigm has shifted from an
acknowledgement that government intervention is needed to correct
the chronic balance of payment problems of LDCs, to a belief that
government intrusion is the real source of the severity of such
problems and "that more liberal economic discipline is necessary to
help prevent such difficulties." '456 "[T]he end of the Cold War, the
debt crisis, and the death of the [New International Economic Order]
movement have decreased the relative bargaining influence of
developing-country governments, at least insofar as they seek policies
different from those preferred by industrialized countries."4"
Given these results, it is not surprising that many "now...
recogniz[e] that the WTO has failed in significant ways to meet the
451. Whelchel, supra note 195, at 417 (emphasis omitted).
452. Galano, supra note 363, at 330 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
453. Zamora, supra note 419, at 1954.
454. Thomas, Balance of Payment Crises, supra note 366, at 1250.
455. Id. at 1264.
456. Id. at 1275.
457. Id. For background on the New International Economic Order movement,
see id. at 1260 n.43.
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aspirations of developing countries." '458 Until there is greater public
participation in these institutions, they will remain fundamentally
undemocratic and unresponsive to the needs of the majority of LDCs'
citizens.4 9 Negotiating to create a new multilateral institution with
jurisdiction over capital controls, or even to grant such jurisdiction to
an existing one, would inevitably force LDCs to cede much control
over their own economic fortunes in return for extremely uncertain
results.
A new multilateral system is not the right solution for another
reason: Law plays no part in most public "discourses" about capital
liberalization.46 The liberalization camp focuses on economic criteria,
and this makes any real solutions to "hot money" problems
unobtainable, as this limited scope of analysis cannot find a middle
ground with legal arguments about economic sovereignty and the
human cost of financial instability.46  The international financial
institutions use these economic criteria as their operating premise and
do not explicitly concern themselves with equity and social justice. 62
The liberal economic paradigm carries with it a fundamental inequity:
"[I]t requires that a disproportionate share of the burden of
adjustment to successive financial crises be borne by workers in...
[LDCs]. '463 The exclusive focus on economic criteria leads to the
inequitable outcome that resolved the Mexican crisis in 1995 and the
Asian in 1997-98: Creditors in the West gave up little, but the LDCs
involved had to follow austerity programs to reassure foreign
investors. 4
Multilateral treaties and organizations are, furthermore, inherently
inflexible. 465 In order for them to evolve and effectively deal with new
situations and conditions, a mechanism to provide for authoritative
interpretation of multilateral treaties and the charters of multilateral
organizations needs to be developed. 66 Until an institutional means
of authoritatively adapting multilateral organizations becomes widely
accepted, a new multilateral institution with jurisdiction over capital
controls should not be implemented.
2. Ceding Sovereignty to Multilateral Institutions
Any discussion of expanded multilateral jurisdiction over
458. Anghie, supra note 192, at 274.
459. See Chi Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International
Economic Law, 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1321, 1322-23 (2000).
460. Canova, Unrestricted Capital Mobility, supra note 183, at 228.
461. See id. at 230.
462. Anghie, supra note 192, at 247.
463. Levinson, supra note 367, at 1.
464. See id. at 17,22.
465. See Eric J. Pan, Note, Authoritative Interpretation of Agreements: Developing
More Responsive InternationalAdministrative Regimes, 38 Harv. Int'l L.J. 503 (1997).
466. See id. at 505.
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international economic matters must consider the sovereignty
problems inherent in multilateral solutions. The idea of sovereignty is
evolving. The "international community can no longer define
sovereignty as an absolute and rigid-individual right of every State
where nation-states are only subject to international rules they
accepted." 7  The modern conception of sovereignty now permits
greater intrusion into a nation's internal affairs and policies, as nations
consent to infringements on their sovereignty in exchange for the
benefits of belonging to multilateral institutions." When LDCs, or
any nations, join a multilateral organization they cede some of their
sovereignty to the organization 69 LDCs in particular must be careful
what sovereignty they cede, as they cannot get it back once ceded and
they cannot stop the natural institutional development of the
organization and its tendency towards increased control in other
areas.
At the same time LDCs cede sovereignty to multilateral institutions
like the IMF, these institutions operate to protect the sovereignty of
the economically dominant states. 7 With the trend toward defining
the limits of sovereignty by consensus, ceding authority to Western-
dominated multilaterals like the IMF allows the West a larger role in
determining this consensus.
Liberalization to appease the IMF and foreign investors takes away
the social safety net in LDCs-the same social safety net that allows
the West to successfully absorb and offset the negative impact of open
trade and financial liberalization.47' The West, furthermore, is not
subject to bouts of IMF conditionality because Western nations
typically do not have to borrow from the IMF. This creates a double
standard 472 with the Western nations telling LDCs to do as they say,
not as they do. This perverse result leads to the poor nations suffering
greater hardship from liberalization than the West."T
Conditionality and imposed rules interfere with sovereignty not
only in the theoretical sense, but also in the sense enunciated in the
Corfu Channel case, a landmark case in international law, that
"sovereignty is a notion that 'has its foundation in national sentiment
and in the psychology of the peoples.' 4 74  Ceding authority over
financial liberalization leads LDCs to trade away their rights to
467. Galano, supra note 363, at 342.
468. See id. at 343; John W. Head, Supranational Law." How the Mfove Towards
Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of "'International" Law, 42 Kan. L
Rev. 605, 627 (1994) (noting that the IMF, the World Bank and the GATI
"represent... surrenders of sovereignty by states to international organizations").
469. Thomas, Good Governance Policy. supra note 361, at 556.
470. Head, supra note 468, at 631.
471. Wendt, supra note 389, at 166.
472. See id. at 168.
473. See Anghie, supra note 192, at 255-56.
474. Galano, supra note 363, at 342.
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protect their citizens and sacrifice their national self-image in
exchange for lender-of-last-resort facilities and the approval of the
Western financial community. Is this a fair bargain? It may be in
some instances, but it is certainly a bargain questionable enough to to
warrant waiting and seeing before LDCs cede sovereignty over capital
controls.
3. Significant Proposals to Expand the Multilateral Framework
Governing Capital Controls
The first issue that warrants consideration at the multilateral level
with respect to capital controls is that of the foreign exchange and
derivatives markets. The foreign exchange and derivatives markets
experienced the greatest increase in financial activity in the 1990s. 75
These markets remain largely unregulated.476 Derivatives, especially
short-term currency derivative contracts, increased in importance as
short-term investment flows have grown.477 These markets hedge
against risk and instability but also help to create it by reacting to
more than just underlying economic conditions, which do not change
as rapidly or in such a pronounced way as capital movements.47 8
One of the best proposals circulating in academic circles is a
multilateral means of imposing standstills, moratoria, or involuntary
deferrals on payments of derivative and other financial contracts when
financial instability hits a developing country.479 Such proposals call
for an international organization to have powers similar to a U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, i.e., to enforce standstills and to negotiate
reductions in payments. 40 This would force creditors to swallow some
of the risk they have taken with respect to financial contracts, instead
of creditors having all the authority to dictate concessions to LDCs,
which they effectively do through IMF conditionality.481 While such
an institution offers much promise in improving the bargaining
position of LDCs vis-A-vis foreign creditors, the current international
climate makes such an institution unlikely. Until the West is ready to
set up an institution that will treat LDCs fairly, the latter are better off
without one.
Another commentator has argued that the orthodox policy presents
liberalization as a choice between the benefits of short-term
475. Zamora, supra note 419, at 1956.
476. Id. at 1957.
477. Whelchel, supra note 195, at 417-18.
478. Zamora, supra note 419, at 1963.
479. See Whelchel, supra note 195, at 418; Chun, supra note 32, at 2652-53.
480. Whelchel, supra note 195, at 418; Chun, supra note 32, at 2674-76 (arguing that
such an institution should have the power to issue: "(1) an automatic stay; (2) a post-
petition creditor preference; (3) a plan of adjustment; and (4) a cramdown
provision").
481. See Chun, supra note 32, at 2700.
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investment and the "dangers of controls on... capital flows," and that
this dichotomy need not be the only two choices. If Western nations
could accept a large-scale transfer of public capital, something akin to
the Marshall Plan, the LDCs could get the stability benefits of capital
controls without suffering a net reduction in foreign investment. 3
While this idea is intriguing, Western nations show little sign of
garnering the political will to effect such a massive transfer of wealth
to LDCs.
Finally, other commentators have recently advocated a system of
"cooperative capital controls," such as an international Tobin tax'-'
regime, saying such a system could bring the benefits of capital
mobility while mitigating its socially regressive and catastrophic
consequences."'
All such proposals have in common that they recognize the Asian
financial crisis and the Mexican crisis not as aberrations, but as
indicators revealing fundamental problems with the current financial
architecture.' Until the problems with the international financial
system gain wider acknowledgement, any new multilateral institution
will be organized according to the liberalization-dominated approach.
The fundamental causes of these crises are not even agreed upon, and
given this "intellectual anarchy," a new consensus seems unlikely to
emerge soon.48 Once new multilateral organizations are established,
membership can become a requirement for LDCs to avoid being
ostracized.' If a new multilateral institution were set up with
jurisdiction over capital controls, or if that jurisdiction were given to
the IMEF, and the Western liberalization mania came to dominate,
LDCs would be worse off than if there were no such institution.
Not all LDCs need capital controls, as many have difficulty
attracting foreign investment at all. Others need capital controls only
when falling returns in developed countries send too many investors
in search of too few productive investment opportunities in
comparatively attractive LDCs. The LDCs that most need capital
controls are those whose financial systems have evolved to the point
where they give foreign investors an initial sense of confidence that
their money is finding efficient employ, but where the systems also fail
to productively channel large flows of short-term investment. Such
countries can quite efficiently absorb many types of foreign
482. Canova, Unrestricted Capital Mobility, supra note 183, at 224.
483. Id. at 225.
484. See William R. White, Note, The Tobin Tax: A Solttion to Today's
International Monetary Instability?, 2 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 365 (1999) (exploring the
justifications for the Tobin tax and arguing that excessive volatility in the foreign
exchange markets show that a Tobin tax would be efficient).
485. See Canova, Financial Liberalization, supra note 129, at 1316-18.
486. Chun, supra note 32, at 2651.
487. Levinson, supra note 367, at 48-49.
488. Head, supra note 468, at 657.
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investment without creating financial instability. Chile, Mexico,
Malaysia and other LDCs only need capital controls when foreign
investors over-anxiously flock to their shores without properly
assessing the country-specific risks involved.489  Such relatively
developed countries do not need controls during times of relatively
low inflows of foreign investment. Given the many shortcomings of
multilateral institutions vis-A-vis the special problems of LDCs, the
economic sovereignty and other interests of the latter will be best
served by continuing to determine on their own when to use capital
controls, rather than allowing a Western-dominated multilateral
consensus to make this decision for them.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that LDCs mainly use capital controls to
enhance stability in their domestic financial markets. Used in this
way, capital controls fulfill a moral necessity when the human cost of
financial instability confronts LDC governments. Capital controls
most effectively achieve this goal by altering the inflow of foreign
investments into the country before a financial crisis erupts. To
mitigate instability, capital controls need primarily to change the
maturity composition of foreign inflows rather than to effect a large
reduction in the overall volume of inflows.
To achieve the desired enhancement of financial stability, a
simultaneous improvement of financial regulations and supervision
must also be implemented. Developing the regulatory structure
necessary to allow an LDC to efficiently absorb unrestricted inflows
of foreign capital takes a great deal of time. The developed world and
multilateral institutions should recognize the amount of time
necessary to achieve such financial development and accept that
capital controls provide an effective means of providing stability in the
interim.4  Continued dogmatic insistence on immediate capital
account liberalization will likely lead to further traumatic instability in
LDCs, which will in turn further alienate these nations from the path
of long-term liberalization. Capital controls can form a part of an
effective long-term liberalization process.
The financial crises of the 1990s have primarily taught us that
capital controls should be imposed when inflows of foreign capital
become heightened. Capital controls can be reduced in times of
general investor withdrawal from emerging markets in order to
489. See Graham Gori, Investors Are Rushing to Mexico, Despite Slowing Growth,
N.Y. Times, May 25, 2001, at WI (noting that, as investment returns lag in the
developed world, investors are seeking out higher returns in Mexico despite warning
signs that the Mexican economy is slowing and will not likely be able to absorb all
foreign investment productively).
490. See Terrill, supra note 92, at 308 (discussing the extended amount of time
required to adopt the necessary structural reforms).
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stimulate investment, but LDCs should not wait until a large-scale pull
back begins to impose emergency outflow control measures. A
proactive use of capital controls can ease a country's transition into a
higher state of development.
No multilateral institution has jurisdiction to restrict LDCs' use of
capital controls. LDCs and developed nations should realize that this
inures to the benefit of both. Economic sovereignty concerns and the
ability of LDCs to shield their citizens from the harshness of financial
instability, as well as the current tendency of multilateral institutions
to protect the interests of developed nations over those of LDCs all
dictate that capital controls should remain under national rather than
supranational control.
Notes & Observations
